HEA Livelihood Baseline Report

Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Strip

June 2013

Occupied Palestinian Territories - Gaza Strip Livelihoods Assessment: Data Collection and Analysis Team

Team

Ahmad Abu Libda	Researcher	Isra Migdad	Researcher
Ahmed Bostan	Researcher	Maher Hamam	Researcher
Alia Hassouna	Researcher	Mohammed Samara	Researcher
Alaa Alyazori	Researcher	Rami Hamdona	Researcher
Ebtisam Qudeih	Researcher	Samer Alswairki	Researcher
Hana Salah	Researcher	Yasmin Al Kattaa	Researcher

Oxfam Staff
Peter Laban - Associate Country Director
Tareq Al Qatta - Project Officer
Ludovica Socci - Gaza Area Manager

Food Economy Group
Stephen Browne - Consultant
Julius Holt - Consultant

Image credits: Ludovica Socci/Oxfam

This publication is funded by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO). The views expressed in this document do not reflect in any way the official opinion of the European Commission and of the European Union.

Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

This study was implemented in the framework of the DG ECHO funded project “Emergency Support to Herder and Bedouin Communities” (ECHO/PSE/BUD/2012/91004).

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 6
Preface From Oxfam 7
Acknowledgements 8

Executive Summary 9
1. Introduction 16
1.1 Background 16
1.2 Objectives of the Assessment 17
1.3 Methods and Process of Baseline Fieldwork 17

2. Livelihood Zone Description 21
2.1 Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone Description 21
2.2 Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone 23

3. Timeline of Events and Reference Year 25
3.1 Timeline 25
3.2 Reference Year 25

4. Market Analysis for the Gaza Strip 26

5. Findings for Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone 27
5.1 Wealth Group Breakdown 27
5.2 Sources of Food 28
5.3 Source of Income 30
5.4 Expenditure Patterns 31
5.5 Survival and Livelihood Protection Thresholds 32

6. Findings for Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone 34
6.1 Wealth Group Breakdown 34
6.2 Sources of Food 35
6.3 Source of Income 36
6.4 Expenditure Patterns 37
6.5 Survival and Livelihood Protection Thresholds 37

7. Livelihood Hazards 37

8. Coping Strategies 37

9. Outcome Analysis and Applications 40
9.1 Outcome Analysis Overview 40
9.2 Gaza Outcome Analysis 40

10. Conclusions and Recommendations 47

Annex 1: The Household Economy Analytical Framework 51
Annex 2: Survival And Livelihood Protection Thresholds 53
Annex 3: Members Hea Advisory Committee 57
Annex 4: Participants Hea Inception Workshop 26Th June 2012 58
Annex 5: Participants Livelihood Zoning Workshop 25-26 September 2012 59
Annex 6: Participants Outcome Analysis April 2013 60

ACRONYMS

ACF - Action Contre la Faim
CHF - Foundation for Cooperative Housing (now Global Communities)
CCA - Climate Change Adaption
CSI - Coping Strategy Index
DRR - Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO - European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization
HEA - Household Economy Analysis
LIAS - Livelihood Impact Analysis Sheets
MoA - Ministry of Agriculture
MOSA - Ministry of Social Affairs
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS - New Israeli Shekel
OA - Outcome Analysis
PARC - Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees
PCBS - Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics
SEFSEC - Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey
UN - United Nations
UNRWA - United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
WFP - World Food Program

PREFACE FROM OXFAM

In the Gaza Strip, people live in a constant state of insecurity where their houses and land, their investments and livelihoods can be destroyed from one day to the next. Surviving in impoverished urban neighbourhoods or semi-rural villages, people here face the daily injustice of the blockade imposed by the Israeli government on Gaza since 2007, which continues to trap the majority of Gaza's 1.6 million people inside a 360 sq km strip of land. The harsh conditions in which most of these communities live could suggest that they are powerless victims, but closer examination reveals a vigorous and resilient population.

In our global work with poor and marginalized communities, Oxfam has identified four "legs and arms" that are critical to their success: mobility, access to markets and services, local organization and communal support. With the publication of this study, Oxfam hopes to offer donors, UN Agencies, international and local NGOs a better understanding of the realities around food insecurity and livelihoods in the Gaza Strip in order to better enable Gaza communities to keep using all four "legs and arms".

By undertaking a thorough analysis of the expenditures urban and semi-rural households make on food and other items necessary to survive or to maintain their livelihood, this study shows that the severe restrictions on mobility and access to markets caused by the blockade have a dramatic negative impact on daily life in the Gaza Strip. On average, the incomes of the poorest and even the less poor are not enough to pay for the minimum food required when compared with international standards. To compensate, they are forced to rely on food aid or increasingly on cash provided by aid agencies to pay for the extra food needed.

While the generous assistance programmes implemented by the international community are appreciated and necessary, this cannot last forever. It is therefore critical that the same international community does everything in its power to press the Israeli government to lift the blockade that denies Palestinian people in Gaza a dignified life. Not only does the future of Palestinian food security and self sufficiency depend on this, but also the aspirations of the Palestinian people in Gaza to live in dignity with the prospect of peace in their own country.

In the meantime, even within the severe constraints imposed by this blockade, efforts must be made to generate economic activity so people can use their "legs and arms" to earn additional income to pay for a higher share of food they need. The many people and organisations that were actively involved in this study have given concrete suggestions for increasing economic activity within Gaza that range from low-external-input and sustainable urban agriculture, local processing and manufacturing to IT applications for which a physical blockade is not a hindrance. Implementing the recommendations presented in this report, along with the concerted political pressure on the Israeli government to end the blockade of Gaza in line with international law, will make a discernible difference to people's lives and bring us one step closer to a just and durable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Winnie Byanyima
Oxfam International Executive Director

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Oxfam would like to acknowledge and thank all participants who collaborated in the implementation of the study and who contributed to the lively discussions in the numerous meetings organized in the course of its implementation. Oxfam would like to express its gratitude in particular to:
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and its local branches, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), Ma'an Development Center, Palestinian Network of NGOs (PNGO), Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), the Applied research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Action Against Hunger (ACF), CARE, Islamic Relief World Wide (IR). Cooperazione Internazionale (Coopi), HelpAge International. Their assistance to the research study team in acquiring and analysing the required data for the study was essential.

Deep acknowledgement goes to the local community leaders and the households interviewed, as well as to the CBO such as, BeitLahiya developmental Association, The Culture and Free Thought Association, Tal Assultan Developmental Committee, AjyalAssciation, Builders Association of Palestine, Association of Palestine Tomorrow, and many other CBO who supported Oxfam in the localities were the study was implemented: BeitLahia, BeitHanoun, Jabalia, Gaza City (Attufah, Ashuja'ia, Azaitun, Beach Camp), JoherAddeek, Annusairat Camp, Deir Al Balah(Al Balad), KhanYounis (Al Balad, Hai Al Amal), Rafah (Tal Assultan, HaiAljnena, Al Balad, Swedish Village, Ashaboura, Rafah Camp).

A particular appreciation Oxfam expresses for the members in the Advisory Committee who followed the study from its start in September 2012 towards its finalization in June 2013, giving precious guidance and advice to the implementation, participated in the outcome and scenario analysis and contributed to the recommendations that are made for future work. Members of the Advisory Committee were World Food Programme (WFP) who hosted most of the Committee meetings, Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committee (PARC), Action Against Hunger (ACF) and Foundation for Cooperative Housing (CHF).

Special acknowledgement goes to the Food Economy Group (FEG), who implemented this study and to the European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) who have followed with much interest and guidance the implementation of the study in Gaza.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose

To enhance the understanding of readers less informed about the desperate situation of the Gaza Strip, it is important to mention at the outset that decades of military and economic crisis and the Israeli imposed blockade have had a severe impact on every aspect of the lives and livelihoods of Palestinian men, women and children in Gaza. This HEA study and its results should be read in this context, one of a protracted blockade of the Gaza Strip, where very basic human rights are not respected.

The purpose of a Household Economy Assessment, as implemented in many other countries in the world with a good number of them commissioned by ECHO, is to provide a baseline for food or energy requirements of households in different livelihood zones in order to assess the degree of food security of a typical household in a specific wealth group. This was indeed the purpose of the HEA implemented between September 2012 and February 2013 in the Gaza Strip. A HEA typically divides populations into livelihood zones, defined by economic geography and similar income and expenditure patterns, while in each livelihood zone of study households – the unit of reference – are divided into wealth groups. It then gives a quantified description of the household economy of typical average households for each wealth group, with an integrated accounting of their food and income sources, and their expenditures. Recognized as a straightforward methodology, based on factual measurement of income and of food and other items produced by the household or acquired in other ways (bought on the market place or provided by aid programmes), it needs to be underscored that a HEA has no pretention to replace food security studies or assessments that are undertaken from a sociological, gender oriented or right-based angle. Where a HEA can provide for the essential facts and figures, other types of studies are needed to get further insight in household dynamics, gender differentiation and other aspects necessary to understand food security at the household level and to further explore necessary actions to take to possibly address food insecurity. Nevertheless a HEA provides objective information that permits comparison of the degree of food security between very different countries, with a standard internationally accepted reference of 2,100 kcal per day being used for measuring energy requirements.

A second important purpose of a HEA is - with the baseline established for a reference year - to analyse the impact of shocks caused by external events (price hikes, earth quakes, drastic changes in aid programmes, or outright conflict) on food security levels, through the development of possible scenarios of most obvious coping strategies of the households under study in different wealth groups in the livelihood zones identified. Again, these possible scenarios are based on factual changes in incomes, food production and provision and expenditures and have no pretention of assessing the social and gender aspects of such shocks. While this is a shortcoming, it does provide a factual basis for further study.

In the Gaza Strip this HEA was implemented through a facilitated process where most relevant actors have been involved both in the data collection, the scenario analysis and the reflection on the conclusions and possible recommendations that this study inspires. The very keen interest many have shown in this study, from interviewed households to key partners in the emergency and development arena in the Gaza Strip, has made it possible also to also provide a number of recommendations both for further programming of humanitarian and development organizations and for further study and follow-up.

2. Methodology and Process

Stakeholder consultation. The HEA study in the Gaza Strip was informed by lessons learnt from the HEA study performed in 2011 in the West Bank. During the most recent assessment, Oxfam engaged from the beginning in a broad stakeholder consultation process and established an HEA Advisory Committee including the various stakeholders working in the Gaza Strip. The Advisory Committee included representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) and Accion Contra le Faim (ACF) representing international NGOs working in Gaza and PARC, representing Palestinian NGOs in Gaza.

Livelihood zoning. The HEA process is typically divided into six steps. The first step in the process is the livelihood zoning, when a country or region of a country is divided according to populations sharing a similar ecology, production conditions and systems, income earning opportunities and market access. Some cities also have distinctive livelihood geographies, e.g. slum areas, residential areas. In September 2012, Oxfam facilitated a Livelihood Zoning exercise in Gaza City with local partners and with the technical support of the Food Economy Group. The exercise identified six livelihood zones in the Gaza Strip, three of which, Greater Gaza Urban Zone, Rafah City Urban Zone and the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone, were identified to be the subjects of the subsequent baseline study. After several weeks of the study the field team discovered that the differences between the Rafah City Urban Zone and the Greater Gaza Livelihood Zone were not

significant (differences in incomes and expenditure patterns were not significantly different) and therefore the two zones were combined into one.

Site selection, sample size. Originally, the baseline study was to commence late October and finish mid-December 2012, however the Israel-Gaza conflict in November delayed the implementation of the study, and the fieldwork for the HEA baseline assessment started in January and continued through February 2013. Two livelihood zones were surveyed during this study: The Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone and the Gaza Semi-Agriculture Livelihood Zone. The selection of the sites for the livelihood zones researched was made in consultation with local partners, mainly UNWRA (for refugee camps), Ministry of Agriculture, and Oxfam staff.

HEA uses a purposeful sample approach towards data collection. From the zoning to the key informant interviews and focus group interviews, HEA's examine livelihood and household operations of those that represent the majority in a specific wealth group. During the course of the field work the field teams conducted interviews in 24 sample locations throughout the Gaza Strip covering both livelihood zones identified. HEA typically identifies 8 sample zone per livelihood zone, as in the practice of over 50 other HEAs doing more zones does not provide added value in terms of average quantitative outcomes. In Gaza in view of the initial selection of two urban livelihood zones, 16 representative sample locations were selected for the Urban Livelihood Zone, next to the 8 sample locations in the Semi-Agriculture Zone. The double sample in the urban zone has strengthened the validity of the outcomes.

Wealth Group Breakdown. In HEA, the Wealth Group Breakdown disaggregates local populations based on local definitions of wealth and usually on quantification of assets - in rural areas of developing countries these are especially productive assets such as land and livestock. The main reason for conducting the wealth group breakdown is to analyse the access that different types of household have to food and cash income. Unlike in rural areas, where household food production is a prime element, in urban contexts households typically source all of their food and non-food items from the market. On the other hand, income sources are more diverse within each wealth group than in rural areas, and in urban HEA studies attention is necessarily focused on the different income levels and expenditure patterns. Where often a HEA considers only three wealth groups in Gaza four wealth groups were distinguished: very poor, poor, lower middle income and upper middle income.

Interviews and focus groups. In each selected sample location first key informants (9 to 12 influential members, doctors, teachers, other notables of which in average 40 % were women) in the community were interviewed to gather information on access to services, population composition, the historical timeline and the seasonal calendar and to establish the wealth breakdown. In total 170 key informants were interviewed in the Gaza Urban Zone and 120 key informants in the Semi-Agricultural Zone.

After each key informant interview the team organized mixed-gender focus group sessions with household representatives. For each of the 4 wealth groups identified in each sample location 4-6 men and women were interviewed. Overall 50% of the household representatives were women, who provided most of the information regarding household expenses and income. In total 190 participants took part in the focus group sessions in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone and 130 in the Gaza Semi-Agriculture Zone.

Coverage and depth. As mentioned the HEA study has doubled the sample size in the Urban Livelihood Zone that represents about 90 to 95 % of the population. The methodology design for this particular study allows only assessing typical households for the different wealth groups in the livelihood zones selected for study. In Gaza these livelihood zones were the two dominant ones and were selected on the basis of recommendations of the Advisory Committee. A further refinement of the assessment by distinguishing

a finer break-down of wealth groups or for different beneficiary groups according to age, gender, health, disabled, etc) is methodologically very possible. However, this would importantly increase sample size and consequently cost of the study. In view of the budget, mandate and terms of references for this study, a further refinement of the samples has not been undertaken. An important part of that mandate includes the comparability of the outcomes of the Gaza HEA study with other HEA studies implemented in more than 50 other countries, that have restricted analysis and sampling to the methodology design applied also here in Gaza.

Reference Year. HEA baseline data provides the socio-economic and livelihood profile of a population within a particular year. This set of reference information, against which future changes in access to income, food and non-food items will be monitored and analysed, is defined as the reference year. For this assessment, the reference year was November 2011 to October 2012. This was chosen because it was the most recent period without significant change to food and income access. It also corresponds well to the seasonal calendar in Gaza agriculture. However, in the very specific situation of Gaza it has to be recognized that, the situation during the reference year is the result of multiple military and economic crises and of years of restrictions on movement, which has had devastating humanitarian consequences on the Palestinian population in Gaza. This means that a large share of families now falling under the poorest categories were better off before the blockade, and therefore had higher "livelihood" conditions/requirements to maintain. Although it would have been maybe preferable to have a reference year much earlier, this is practically impossible as people would not be able to assess precisely enough their expenditures and incomes so long ago.

3. Findings

Gaza Markets and the Effect of the Blockade

Market access in both the Greater Gaza Urban and the Gaza Semi-Agriculture Livelihood Zones is adequate. For the most part, households are capable of finding a wide variety of goods at any of the markets throughout the strip. The flow of goods does not fluctuate greatly throughout the year except as Ramadan and Eid approach. Most of the food goods that come through the Rafah tunnels are from Egypt; however some Israeli products also enter and are considered to be of higher quality and tend to be more expensive.

The underground tunnels serve a major role in importing various commodities into Gaza and its effect on the local economy is widely considered as a life-line, especially since the Israeli blockade. Referred to as the tunnel economy, the illicit tunnel trade, already present since the 1990's became more intensified in 2007 when the Israeli government imposed a near complete blockade of all movements in and out Gaza and strict trade sanctions. The initial effect of the blockade was a scarcity of essential goods such as food, fuel, clothes, etc. Gaza residents then started constructing more tunnels between Gaza and Egypt facilitating the 'illegal' supply of goods to satisfy local demand. From 2007 until 2010 the most common commodities to pass through the tunnels were food, clothes, electronic items and fuel. From 2010 to the present, the primary commodities passing through the tunnels were construction materials, mainly aggregate steel, but also food and non-food goods. In recent years, however, the Egyptian government has been trying to minimize this tunnel trade while in the same period Israeli armed forces continued periodic shelling of the Gaza Strip. Despite these events the tunnels still serve as a crucial life-line to the people in the Gaza Strip.

Thanks to the tunnels and the movements of goods through the Israeli checked crossings (which are highly restrictive), the primary problem in Gaza is not a lack of food or non-food goods but rather a lack of viable and stable income earning opportunities to pay for them. Apart from political instability and the continuous threat of military escalation, almost 8 years of severe blockade of most movements of good and people can be considered as the overriding reason preventing people in Gaza from developing their livelihoods and economy. The blockade of movement of people and goods entering and leaving the Gaza Strip, has had a major negative impact on Gaza's ability to grow its economy, to create job opportunities for its population and for its people living in Gaza to live a normal and decent life.

The labour market can be separated into formal and informal sectors. The formal labour market depends on government institutions, private companies, NGOs and UN agencies as the main income providers. In both livelihood zones there are a number of households that benefit from stable employment. The informal labour market consists of income earning opportunities that are more casual than permanent. For the majority of poorer households the lack of stable employment opportunities means that they must find varied ways of earning cash. This can be through petty trade, performing casual agricultural labour, collecting and selling recyclable goods, construction work, etc.

Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone

Household economies in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone are mostly employment-driven. Poorer households rely on casual labour activities, e.g. skilled and unskilled construction work, domestic labour, factory work, working in small shops, tunnel related work, petty trading, collecting and selling of recycled materials, etc. In addition to casual labour, some households engage in self-employed activities, including taxi driving, owning small shops or food stalls, or somewhat larger trading. The less poor tend to have fixed salaried em-



ployment, mostly government salaries, or Non-Government Organizations (NGO), United Nations (UN) and private company jobs.

Livelihood strategies in each zone are studied by looking at three components: source of food, income sources and expenditure patterns.

When examining the sources of food in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone, it is clear that the food access has more to do with access to cash and the households' capacity to afford it rather than its availability on the market. In this zone, food is sourced from the market and/or as food aid. When compared to the international recommended kilocalorie allowance per person per day (2100 kcals), the HEA study shows that, on average, all households groups exceeded the recommended energy intake, as long they receive food aid. However, taking a Palestine-specific allowance 2355 kcals pppd (explained in the main body of the report) the very poor fell just short, achieving 99% (equivalent to 111% of 100% of the international standard). This does not suggest that there are no people within the poorest wealth groups that are at risk of food insecurity. The findings in this report represent the majority of the population, and not necessarily certain minority groups that fall within each wealth group. This is due to the mandate and the general level at which the research methodology is applied in this study. Further and more detailed study would allow distinguishing more specific target groups as children, disabled and pregnant women.

As in most urban economies the sources of cash or income earning opportunities in Gaza are limited. It was found that with their current incomes, very poor, poor and to a lesser degree lower-middle households were not able to meet their food energy needs without the assistance of food aid and without reducing expenditure on other items such as education, medicine, meat, vegetables, etc. At the same time, although very poor and poor households earn cash from a variety of casual labour and self-employment activities, over half of their income comes from various cash assistance, gifts and/or loans. This underscores the important role of aid at present and the need to develop projects to create employment activities. Lower middle-income households, in addition to their income from salaried employment or small-scale businesses etc., also often seek loans or gifts from others, but the amounts (both absolute and proportional) are not as much as those required by the very poor and poor. Most upper middle households get all of their income from salaried employment, but some also own a small business.

As regards expenditure patterns, one of the main differences between wealth groups is the proportion of the household budget allocated to essential versus non-essential needs. The wealthier a household is the greater its ability to afford higher quality, more expensive products from Israel. In terms of social services, (medicine, education, etc.), wealthier households visit private clinics, and send their children to universities, etc. which are more expensive.

Gaza Semi-Agriculture Livelihood Zone

The livelihood system here is termed 'semi-agricultural' because people typically rely both on agriculture and on employment or other activities in the adjacent urban zone. Though the majority of people in this zone engage in activities related to crop and livestock production, their proximity to the urban zone and the associated markets highly influences the types of foods and income sources they have access to, as well as their expenditure patterns. Some lower and upper middle households living in this zone have jobs with government organizations, NGOs, UN agencies and private companies based in the Urban Livelihood Zone. However, like the poorer households most of the middle households' income comes from agriculture production.

Unlike the urban livelihood zone, households here benefit from the ability to cultivate some of their food. The ability of households in this zone to produce some of their food takes the burden off the amount of food households must purchase at the market. But with their current food production and cash incomes they cannot meet all of their food needs, and a significant part of their food needs are covered by food aid. Taking into account all their food sources, including food and cash aid, on average, all household groups were

able to meet their annual food needs, even applying the energy requirement of 2355 kcal pppd. Similar to the Greater Gaza Urban Zone, the findings in this report represent the majority of people in each wealth group. Some people within each wealth group may not be able to meet their annual needs, though they represent the minority.

Sources of cash in this zone differ from those in the urban areas as many households have access to land to cultivate crops. In fact, all households in this zone sell a portion of the crops they produce for cash, but their level of earnings is contingent both on the types of crops they grow and the number of dunums[1] they cultivate. For the very poor and poor households, on such land they cultivate for themselves most of the produce is for household consumption, although a remainder is sold. They tend to cultivate low-risk, low-input vegetables, such as chilli's, zucchini, eggplant, and cereals - mainly wheat, barley. The middle households cultivate more land and therefore allocate more dunums to the production of vegetables, citrus and olives for sale. They have the capital to invest in the needed inputs and to hire labourers to help with various farming tasks.

Expenditure patterns in this zone mirror those in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone. Poorer households use a great proportion of their cash on food items, than on household goods and social services. Their wealthier neighbours spend a far greater proportion (and absolute amount) of their budget on farm inputs. Most of poorer households' expenditure on inputs is on credit, having to pay back the creditor at the time of harvest.

Comparing Total Income to Survival and Livelihood Protection Thresholds

Total food and cash income are compared against two thresholds (see section below). The survival threshold represents total food and cash income needed to cover the cost of 2,100 Kcals of food per person per day and the non-food items necessary for survival. The livelihoods protection threshold includes not only survival but also the expenditure required to sustain livelihoods in the mid to long term. These items include transportation cost, education, medical services, agricultural inputs, etc.

The survival threshold, as defined in the Gaza context, contains a mixed basket of wheat, rice, oil, sugar and lentils, drinking water and cooking fuel.

Outcome (Scenario) Analysis Results

The HEA methodology offers a way of quantifying the prediction of the effects of economic shocks on people's capacity to consume enough food and maintain their livelihoods. This is called Outcome or Scenario Analysis; it deals with scenarios where a shock (or shocks) is set against the baseline information on people's 'normal' existence and takes account of their strategies and capacity of coping (i.e. of finding extra cash)[2].

During an Outcome/Scenario Analysis exercise held in April 2013, participants from Oxfam, Action against Hunger, WFP, UNRWA and FAO, developed three scenarios to test on the population of very poor households in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone. The first scenario is divided into two sub-scenarios looking at the effect of a reduction of food and cash aid to poorer households. In sub-scenario 1a, a 50% and 100% reduction in food rations is imposed in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone. For very poor households this results in a livelihoods protection deficit of 9% and 27% respectively. The items that fall under the livelihoods protection threshold include non-staple foods, such as vegetables, meat, fish, fruit, etc., medical, school expenditures and other items essential to maintain life at the status quo. Households were not able to maintain their normal dietary diversity, and their expenditure on livelihoods protection would be compromised significantly. A reduction in dietary over the long-term might lead to micro-nutrient deficiencies. Also, reduction in

1. 1 dunum = 1/10 of a hectare
2. See Practitioners' Guide to HEA – Chapter 4: Outcome Analysis http://www.feg-consulting.com/resource/practitioners-guide-to-hea/4%20Outcome%20Analysis.pdf

expenditure on non-food items such as education and health would affect households' ability to improve the livelihood or future livelihoods of their children. Education expenditure alone is not a fail-safe component to escape poverty but it is important in opening doors to wider opportunities that contribute to poverty reduction. In the next sub-scenario, 1b, food and cash aid is reduced by 50% and 100%. This deepened the livelihood protection deficit of very poor households to 41% and 100% respectively. The latter sub-scenario would also result in a survival deficit of 3%, meaning the beginning of outright hunger. Although these latter scenarios are purely hypothetical, in that no authority or agency would entertain such deep, absolute cuts in aid, it is of interest to see what level of increase of household income (e.g. through income generation projects) would be necessary to cover the gaps (scenario 1c below). In this scenario we see that the challenge is to add respectively 44% and 103% of current cash income.

The second scenario posited an extreme staple food price spike of 200% for very poor households in both livelihood zones. The results of this scenario showed that households would be able to meet their survival threshold, but at the risk of reducing expenditure on education, medicine, and a more diverse diet. Finally, the third scenario was specific to the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone. This was a positive scenario of increased access to agricultural land that currently falls within the buffer zone on very poor households. The result of this scenario shows that the very poor and poor households in this zone will exceed their livelihood protection thresholds. Since in the reference year very poor households sold minimal amounts of crops, the main increase of income would come from extra agricultural employment on other people's land.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

The above HEA Outcome/Scenario Analysis makes it clear that with current levels of household income poorer households would not be able to cope with a substantial reduction of assistance in food and/or cash, even if they might not go absolutely hungry. However, in a very strict sense, the study also indicates that even with such a substantial reduction in food and/or cash assistance, people could still meet their basic energy requirements be that put either at the 2100 kcal or 2355 kcal level per day. Nevertheless, if they were indeed forced by a reduction of such assistance to switch expenditure to maintaining their basic survival food basket, this would be at considerable cost to the proper balance of their diets and/or what should be considered essential livelihood expenditure, including for instance school and health costs.

The study suggests that in view of the lack of perspective of a substantial lifting of the blockade imposed by the government of Israel on Gaza, there are no short-term and quick-fit solutions to substantially replace the much needed food and cash assistance by other interventions. Indeed, in the unique situation of Gaza, the blockade can be considered as the root problem

for the current process of de-development in Gaza, the resulting precarious food security situation and the severe limitation of people's income earning options. From the study it is also indicated that there is not really a shortage in food supply but an extreme difficulty of people in lower wealth groups to pay for it. There is rather a problem of food accessibility than food availability. Nevertheless, expanding job and other income opportunities would be a priority in a longer term perspective, and therefore it is important to see what resources are available to people and how to develop them in a way to stimulate at least a modest improvement in income of the poorer households, in the short-term and under a continuing blockade. It is hence recommended to explore more actively opportunities that can increase economic activity within the Gaza Strip. A number of suggestions are given here inspired by the study and proposed by the numerous people involved in the household and key informant interviews and by the further consultations with the different actors actively engaged in this study.

Informed by the outcome of this HEA, four main directions for recommendations could be given:

a. Continued food and cash assistance as long as the blockade is maintained and hence economic activity is severely constrained. In view of the observed availability of food on the market a priority should be given to cash assistance, so that people can make their own choices. Such assistance should give important attention to measures that can contribute to bridge the gap and allow for transition between relief and development.

b. Interventions that will reduce expenditures on public services, for instance by increasing the provision and effectiveness and such services. At the same time measures to reduce energy costs for heating and cooking could also contribute to reduce expenditures and make financial household resources available for other basic needs as food.

c. Increased investments in local economic activity that could trigger innovative developments to contribute to – even if only partly – alleviating the current situation of very limited job and income opportunities. The discussions held around this study have given inspiration to a number of potential avenues that would deserve further exploration. Among these are interventions that promote small-scale urban agriculture, manufacturing and IT/internet business.

d. Enhancing follow-up activities to further refine findings of the HEA here reported and to explore how the HEA baseline could be used for monitoring and assessing impact of both emergency and development activities. Such follow-up could be accompanied by a further disaggregation of beneficiary wealth and social groups, including gender and age differentiation. At the same time the quantitative HEA approach should be accompanied by more rights-based approaches to capture social and gender dynamics in household coping strategies. Further follow-up of the dynamic stakeholder process around this HEA study could be nurtured by embedding it in the institutional frameworks available in the Gaza Strip.

It is hoped that the results and recommendations of the study will contribute to building an evidence-based resource for use by all actors, offering a more rounded understanding of local household economies and risks and in particular answering questions on the levels and causes of possible food gaps. The study is intended to help actors to identify priorities for protection of local livelihoods in face of possible shocks, and to provide cogent evidence for advocacy on the dramatic situation in Gaza caused by a blockade that has already lasted too long.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Following the Household Economy Assessment (HEA) of herders in the West Bank, the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) decided to commission a further HEA exercise in the Gaza Strip to be carried out by Oxfam under the technical guidance of the Food Economy Group. The study, conducted mainly through field interviews was carried out in January and February 2013, and was undertaken in consultation with all relevant actors in Gaza.

In 2007, the Israeli government imposed a strict blockade of certain commodities from entering the Gaza Strip and strict cross-border movement limits of Palestinian citizens in Gaza. Over the years the blockade has hindered economic development and reconstruction efforts. The average unemployment rate in 2006 was 32 percent and at the end of 2011 it was estimated at 44 percent. Since the blockade in 2007 and leading up to the present Household Economy Analysis (HEA) study's reference year (November 2011 – October 12) , unemployment continued to rise to nearly 50 percent, then falling slightly to about 45 percent toward the fourth quarter of 2011. Numerous reports cite that the blockade was the primary cause of high unemployment rates, decreased purchasing power and increased poverty.

In addition, over the past decade, the Israeli Armed Forces has gradually expanded restrictions on access to farmland on the Gaza side of the 1949 'Green Line' and to fishing areas along the Gaza Strip coast, with the stated intention of preventing attacks on Israel by Palestinian armed factions, including the firing of home-made and longer-ranged rockets. Since 2008, Palestinians in Gaza have been prohibited from accessing land located up to 1,000-1,500 meters from the Green Line, an area estimated at 35 percent of the agricultural land in Gaza. The 20 nautical miles of sea access established by the Oslo Accords were gradually reduced to 3 nautical miles in 2009. After the November 2012 military escalation, the maritime access of 3 nautical miles was increased to 6 nautical miles as part of the brokered cease-fire understanding between the Israeli government and Hamas. De-facto four months later the situation is back to a 3 nautical miles restriction.

As of 2012 the Gaza Strip has a population of approximately 1.6 million people. The majority of Gaza's residents, 1.59 million are found in urban areas while the remaining 45,000 live in the rural areas. Refugees live

in both urban and semi-rural areas, inside and outside camps, and overall constitute approximately 70% of the Gaza population. Most of these refugees arrived in Gaza from the central and Southern areas of pre-1948 Palestine and have resided in Gaza since shortly after 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Today the refugee camps are part of the overall urban area and the people have integrated with the overall urban population, making it difficult to differentiate the two.

The communities classified as refugee have long integrated into the overall urban context. In fact, the majority of refugees actually live outside the pre-established camps. On the ground, the boundaries of the refugee communities blend into the rest of the urban landscape rendering it difficult to differentiate between the two, except that refugee areas tend to have denser housing. During the livelihoods zoning exercise which began the HEA survey process, it was determined that levels of wealth, income activities and sources of food are so similar between refugee camp residents and the rest of the urban population that there was no good reason to study them as separate populations. This was confirmed during the course of the fieldwork, from the community leader interviews through wealth group interviews. The field data confirm that, given some difference in the ration package, there is not a significant difference between refugees and non-refugees in terms of income, which is by far the dominant factor. In the localities of study refugee income was in one or other wealth group both higher and lower than in the non-refugee localities; and refugees and non-refugee share the same difficulties in finding employment or otherwise increasing their income.

Though ration packages are different between refugees and non-refugees HEA looks at the situation of the majority of the population and does not focus on sub-groups. A detailed assessment of the refugee population may yield nuanced results and perhaps differences when compared to the larger population.

1.2 Objectives of the Assessment

The purpose of the study was to identify priority livelihood zones and within these to describe livelihoods and measure thresholds for household food security and livelihood security. The use of the HEA methodology seems particularly pertinent as it provides detailed and quantified baseline data on household economy of different wealth groups in different livelihood zones, thus giving a disaggregated picture of the lives of the population. It also explores market risks and opportunities and allows the development of scenarios to predict how various shocks may affect livelihoods, or alternatively to foresee the impact of a potential livelihood program.

The standard HEA methodology used here takes the household as the unit of reference, and questions of food security and livelihoods are analyzed on that basis, in relation to different levels of wealth. HEA does not look into the separate roles of household members, although it computes the income of the men, women and working children. As such, standard HEA is not aimed at gender- or child- or aged persons-related analysis. On the other hand, because the different members of households are fundamentally affected by the overall household economy, the HEA description of households' economic status and operations – their assets, income, expenditure and consumption - offer an important first basis for understanding the situation of individuals. For special purposes, when requested, the field methodology can be adapted to answer special questions, including regarding gender, although this has implications in terms of extra field time and cost. Even so, there is just so much that a field survey can realistically include in order obtaining useful results. Specific questions of gender, for instance, are generally better served by separately designed surveys, whether of the socio-political / rights status of women, or intra-household sharing of food, or analysis of women's work/time budgets versus childcare needs or other subjects. The HEA baseline, in accounting for household income and expenditure, would provide a particularly good context for special follow-up inquiry into women's employment and its constraints, and women's access to and control of the cash that comes into the household.

A second important purpose of a HEA is - with the baseline established for a reference year - to analyse the impact of shocks caused by external events (price hikes, earth quakes, drastic changes in aid programmes, or outright conflict) on food security levels, through the development of possible scenarios of most obvious coping strategies of the households under study in different wealth groups in the livelihood zones identified. Again, these possible scenarios are based on factual changes in incomes, food production and provision and expenditures and have no pretention of assessing the social and gender aspects of such shocks. While this can be considered as a shortcoming, it also provides a factual basis for further study.

It is hoped that the results and recommendations of the study will contribute to building an evidence-based resource for use by all actors, offering a more rounded understanding of local household economies and risks and in particular answering questions on the levels and causes of possible food gaps. The study is intended to help actors to identify priorities for protection of local livelihoods in face of possible shocks, and to provide cogent evidence for advocacy.

1.3 Methods and Process of the Baseline Fieldwork

In undertaking the HEA study in the Gaza Strip, lessons learnt from the HEA study performed in 2012 in

the West Bank were adopted. During this assessment, Oxfam engaged in a broad stakeholder consultation process and established an HEA Advisory Committee including the various stakeholders working in the Gaza Strip. The Advisory Committee included representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) and Accion Contra le Faim (ACF) representing international NGOs working in Gaza and PARC, representing Palestinian NGOs in Gaza.

The first step in the six step HEA analytical framework (see Annex 2) is the livelihood zoning. In Gaza, as in other countries, the territory was divided according to populations sharing similar ecology, production conditions and systems, income earning opportunities and market access. Once the livelihood zones have been identified and concluded, the HEA study then differentiates wealth groups amongst the population within each zone to be studied.

In September 2012, Oxfam, with the technical supervision of the Food Economy Group, facilitated a Livelihood Zoning exercise in Gaza City. The Livelihood Zoning exercise was conducted during a two day workshop which included the participation of key international and local stakeholders. The objective of the livelihood zoning was to identify livelihood zones in the Gaza Strip and to focus the subsequent baseline study on the zones most relevant to the stakeholders involved. The Livelihood Zoning exercise identified six livelihood zones:
Zone 1: Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone, including Gaza City, Jabaliya, Deir Al Balah, Khan Yunis, smaller town areas, and including the Refugee Camp areas.
Zone 2: Rafah City Urban Livelihood Zone including its Refugee Camp area.
Zone 3: Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone.
Zone 4: Gaza High Production Agricultural Livelihood Zone.
Zone 5: Herder Livelihood Zone
Zone 6: Gaza Fishing Livelihood Zone

The selection of the livelihood zones for further study was made in consultation with the HEA Advisory Committee members and ECHO. Due to time and budget constraints the first three zones were selected. Another reason was the small population in the non-selected livelihood zones (high production agriculture, herders and fishermen livelihood zones).

During the Livelihood Zoning exercise in September 2012 it was suggested that the Rafah City Urban Livelihood Zone was heavily influenced by the cross-border tunnel trade with Egypt. Some of the workshop participants argued that the 'tunnel economy' was so dominant that it significantly increased business activities and resulted in a relatively high offer of employment for the poorer section of the local population, and higher incomes than elsewhere. As such, it was deemed that poor households in this zone were different in livelihood terms from their neighbours in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone. There were opinions for and against keeping the Rafah Zone separate from the Greater Urban areas, but it was agreed that since there was no firm evidence or very strong personal knowledge of poorer livelihoods here, the question would be left open pending further investigation.

After several weeks of investigating both the Rafah City Urban Livelihood Zone and the Greater Gaza Livelihood Zone, the field team discovered that the influence of the underground cross border trade with Egypt was not as significant as it was previously thought in terms of offering employment opportunities to the residents of Rafah. In fact, the cross border trader labourers came from all areas of Gaza, not just from Rafah. Also, the daily wage earned by tunnel labourers had decreased from $100 USD per day or 388 NIS to roughly 100 to 150 NIS per day[4]. Furthermore, an interim analysis of the results for both zones showed that food sources, income and expenditure patterns across all wealth groups were strikingly similar. Therefore, the Rafah City Urban Zone was merged with the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone. Map 1 above incorporates the changes made to the livelihood zones since the Zoning Exercise in September.

In November 2012, Oxfam and the Food Economy Group facilitated an HEA Baseline Training in Gaza City. During six days 14 data collectors were trained in the HEA Livelihood Framework. At the same time the Food Economy Consultant and Oxfam worked out field logistics, selected field sites and coordinated with MOSA to organize community leaders for the upcoming field work. After the training, the HEA field team commenced the fieldwork, starting with community leader interviews in two sites, one in Khan Yunis and the other in Beit Lahyia. That same day, the Israeli military assassinated the Hamas military leader Ahmed Al Jabari. This event marked the beginning of an eight days military escalation in Gaza. This forced the postponement of the HEA livelihoods assessment in Gaza.

In January 2013, the Food Economy Group consultant and the Gaza-based field team resumed the HEA baseline in two selected Livelihood Zones: the Greater Gaza Urban Zone (including Rafah) and the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone. The duration of the fieldwork for both zones was approximately five weeks.

4. NIS = 3.88139 per 1 USD * Oanda.com

HEA is an analytical framework, not a particular method of data collection. Participtory Rural Appraisal methods, including focus group interviews for wealth-groups, have usually been the method of choice in the field as surveys can be done relatively quickly. But a particular feature of the HEA interview process is the extensive cross-checking (triangulation) during the interview, making sure that things 'add up' sensibly, as described below in reference to interviews with household representatives. This tends towards more robust data and speed of final analysis. The sample locations for HEA study are identified purposively, meaning the sample units are selected with key informants on the basis of their known characteristics. The livelihood zoning is the first step in this process which is then cross-checked at the key informant and wealth group levels.

During the assessment the following interviews were conducted:

Interviews with market traders throughout the Gaza Strip. The team visited 10 markets throughout the Strip and collected data on the fluctuation of commodity prices in the reference year (November 2011 - October 2012)[5], important trade flows of the main staple foods purchased by households and the main commodities traded by households.

Interviews with community leaders. The team conducted 24 semi-structured interviews throughout Gaza Strip with key informants. Interviews for refugee camps were coordinated by Oxfam with the assistance of UNRWA, while non-refugee site coordination was assisted by MOSA. In each selected site 9 to 12 influential members of the community were interviewed (doctors, teachers, other notables of which in average 40 % were women). In total 170 key informants were interviewed in the Gaza Urban Zone and 120 key informants in the Semi-Agricultural Zone. The purpose of these interviews was to gather information on access to services, population composition, the historical timeline and the seasonal calendar and to establish the wealth breakdown[6] of the population. After each community leader interview the team organized focus group sessions of household representative of each of the wealth groups identified during the exercise.

5 This reference year was chosen because it was the most recent period without significant change to food and income access in Gazan terms: i.e there was –relatively speaking - no catastrophic event or change, but the inheritance of the economic events and constraints of previous years impinge on the current year situation.

6 In HEA, poverty is broken into categories defined by local standards. However, HEA uses the 'poor' category to establish survival and livelihood protection thresholds, assuming that they are meeting their caloric energy needs and the other essentials that fall under livelihoods protection. The benchmarks for poverty used in Gaza (as well as the West Bank) by the PCBS are classified into two poverty categories: abject poverty which is the minimum cost of food, which satisfies the nutritional needs (in terms of daily-required calories) of individuals. It basically reflects the total cost of basic food consumption needs; and absolute poverty, which is is the amount of money that is required to meet minimum basic food and non-food needs.

Interviews with household representatives. Extensive interviews to establish income and expenditure patterns at wealth group level were conducted with 64 focus groups at different income levels (very poor, poor, lower middle and upper middle) in 16 communities within the Greater Gaza Urban Zone. The better off wealth group was not interviewed, partly because local community leaders said it would be difficult to call them for interviews and partly because this group is of less interest to Oxfam and partner NGOs. Within the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone the team conducted 32 focus group interviews spanning eight communities. In each zone a range of 2 to 6 people participated in each interview. The household economy information was cross-checked during and across interviews: it is a cardinal feature of HEA fieldwork that the information must be seen to 'add up' at the fieldwork stage. Overall 50% of the household representatives were women, who provided most of the information regarding household expenses and income. In total 190 participants took part in the focus group sessions in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone and 130 in the Gaza Semi-Agriculture Zone.

During each household representative interview a twelve-month account of food sources was established. Calculating the food intake in energy terms – in calories - during interviews is one of cross-checks. If household consumption amounts to less than 100% of the kilocalorie needs (usually based on the international standard of 2100 kcals per person per day – see section 5.2 below) then additional probing needs to take place. A twelve month account of income and expenditures is also gathered during these interviews, and a second cross-check is to balance the amount of cash earn with the expenditure patterns. If there are discrepancies then more questioning is required. In this process it is common for further interesting details to be revealed, adding a story to back-up the quantitative results.

Site Selection and Sample Size. In most HEA studies the sample size per livelihood zone is 8 sites (or villages). Experience has demonstrated that with 8 sites data-outliers are balanced out. For the Greater Gaza Urban Zone, a total of 16 sites were sampled, twice as many as is normally done, further strengthening the outcomes of the study. A normal sample of 8 sites were selected for the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone The selection of the sites for the livelihood zones researched was made in consultation with local partners, mainly UNWRA (for refugee camps), Ministry of Agriculture, and Oxfam staff.

The table below highlights the number of sites visited per livelihood zone and the approximate number of people interviewed.

Analysis of information, compilation of the baseline picture, and development of scenarios. The household economy baseline analysis was conducted from February 11 to 17 and is available in a baseline storage spreadsheet. A Livelihood Impact Analysis Spreadsheet (LIAS) was also prepared to allow scenario analysis during the Outcome Analysis (OA) training which was held in Jerusalem from April 3 to 11. Scenarios identified by key stakeholders were analysed during the Outcome Analysis training and are presented in this report (Section 9.2).

Zone	Governorate/Locality	HEA Focus Group Interviews
Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone[7]	**North Gaza:** Beit Lahyia, Jabaliya **Gaza:** Zaytoun, Tufah, Shate Camp **Middle:** Al Nuseirat Camp, Deir al Balah **Khan Yunis:** Al Amal, Balad **Rafah:** Balad, Suwaydiya, Saboura, Garbiye, Jenina, Shokat	**Market level ≈** 7-8 individuals **Community leader level ≈** 144-192 individuals **Household level wealth group interviews ≈** 128 -256 individuals
Gaza Semi-Agriculture Zone	**North Gaza:** Beit Hanoun **Gaza:** Al Mughraqa **Middle:** Az Zawayda, Al Musaddar, Wadi as Salqa **Khan Yunis:** Al Qarara, Al Fukhkari, Kuz'za	**Market level ≈** 2-3 individuals **Community leader level ≈** 72-96 individuals **Household level wealth group interviews ≈** 64 – 128 individuals
TOTAL		≈ 550 respondents

7. The result of merging the two urban livelihood zones was that the sample size typically done in HEA assessments was doubled.

2. Livelihood Zone Descriptions

2.1 Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone Description

2.1.1. General description

The Gaza territory is 365 km2 and has approximately 1.6 million inhabitants[8] or, 4,500 people per km^2. Some 95%[9] of Palestinians in Gaza reside in the urban areas. The landscape of the urban zone is dominated by concrete multi-level apartment buildings and/or businesses. Most of the roads in the urban zone are paved, either with stone or asphalt. There are two main asphalted arteries connecting all the five governorates and the main towns. To the east, Salah el Dein Road is the most significant of the two, starting in North Gaza and continuing to Rafah, this road serves as the main commercial route in the territory. It is part of the ancient main road from Egypt to Lebanon. The coastal road to the west, parallels the Salah el Dein road but hugs Gaza's scenic coast line from north to south.

The locations included under the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone encompass all of the urban areas inside the Gaza Territory. The Rafah zone, as explained above, is included in this Livelihood Zone. Map 2 shows the different locations of the overall zone, shaded in grey. The economy of this zone, like most of Gaza is heavily affected by Israeli blockade restrictions that have severely limited the legal flow of goods crossing into the territory and prevented the flow of goods crossing out into Israel.

As in most urban livelihood zones, the household economy of the great majority of people is employment-driven. Most households rely on casual labour activities, e.g. skilled and unskilled construction work, domestic labour, factory work, working in small shops, tunnel related work; They also engage in petty trading, collecting and selling of recycled materials and other small-scale activities. Others, at a different level of income, engage in self-employment activities, including taxi driving, owning small shops, or food stalls, or somewhat larger trading enterprises. Others have fixed salaried employment, mostly government salaries, Non-Government Organizations (NGO), United Nations (UN) and private company jobs.

Many of Gaza's urban poor receive a portion of their annual income as cash assistance, either from UNWRA, MOSA or an NGO operating in the Gaza Strip. This income is in addition to food distributions or food voucher programs. In addition, credit from shop keepers and family members is another vital source of temporary income, especially for the zone's poorer households. Credit is often supplied by local shopkeepers and is paid back. But "loans" are very often not paid back, so that they are in effect gifts provided by family members or close friends.

2.1.2 Provision of Services

Households living in the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone have a range of services available, including water, sanitation, communication, electricity, health and education. The frequency and quality of the services like water, trash disposal, and electricity varies according to location. Health and education services also vary according to those living in the refugee camp areas and those who do not. However, these variations do not affect the outcome of the study (incomes and expenditures).

All households in this zone source water from their municipality supply. The water used is reliant on the coastal aquifer. As the aquifer level declines the infiltration of sea-water has made 90 percent of the water undrinkable. In addition to poor water quality the flow of piped water is irregular especially during the summer months (see Seasonal Calendar below). The cost of the water services is approximately 30 to 40 NIS per month. Drinking water is purchased from tankers at an estimated cost of 30 NIS per month. A sanitation service including garbage disposal is provided by the municipality and for those in the refugee camps by UNRWA. In Rafah, sanitation services were less reliable and in some parts non-existent.

Throughout the zone and Gaza electricity is irregular. Nearly all residents have electricity supplied to their residences, however the service is limited to 6-8 hours per day. Most of the power supplied to Gaza comes from Israel while the remainder is obtained from Gaza's power plant and Egypt. Households and businesses that are able to afford the cost have generators to fill in for the failures of supply.

Health services vary throughout the livelihood zone. The majority of non-refugee households use government clinics and hospitals to meet their needs while refugees use UNRWA clinics. Treatment at UNRWA clinics is typically free of cost while government clinics and hospital may charge on a case by case basis. Though basic health services are available, medical supplies and some medicines are generally unavailable. Households that can afford it usually go to private clinics.

Primary and secondary education provided by government and UNRWA schools is free of charge for all Palestinians in Gaza. Though fees associated with education are waived, households still incur costs, especially

8. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), On the Eve of the International Population Day 11/07/2012, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/int_Pop_2012e
9. United Nations Country Team, Gaza in 2020: A livable place?, August 2012

for stationery, uniforms, pocket money and transportation. Households that have members in a university or technical school incur higher education costs annually.

2.1.3 Seasonal Calendar

The seasonal calendar below outlines relevant events that occur throughout a 'normal' year in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone. Though seasonality is less important in urban livelihood zones than in rural zones, it does to some degree influence household expenditures. In the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone the rainy season commences in November and continues through February. The rainy season is the winter season, with typically between 300mm to 400mm of rainfall annually. During this period many households outfit their house with plastic sheeting to insulate it from the colder conditions. They will also incur higher heating cost associated with kerosene heaters. Vegetables such as tomatoes, eggplant and onions are important ingredients in the Mediterranean diet. Vegetable prices fluctuate throughout the year and become more expensive during the winter season. This is typically a result of a decrease in the supply of locally produced vegetables. After the main harvest period (which runs between May and August), vegetables are frozen to be sold during the winter months.

Tunnel labour activities occur throughout the year but tend to decrease slightly during the winter months and particularly when it rains more: one reason for a decline in tunnel activity is flooding and tunnel collapses due to rainwater. Though most households in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone find labour opportunities in towns and cities, some city-based labourers travel to nearby agriculture areas to look for work especially during the citrus and olive harvesting periods in October.

In the summer months, June through August, temperatures in Gaza rise and the water table begins to decline. This contributes to irregularity of water services provided by the municipal water system, the main supply of water for urban residents.

School expenditures, which include fees (where applicable), books, stationary, uniforms and shoes are incurred twice every year, once in February and again in September. This does not include the pocket money that is often given to students. The timing of these expenses is important since households need to make sure to have sufficient money during that time. The September expenditure however is not usually problematic as many poorer households receive money from the zakat between July and August.

The months of Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr change over the years, and the calendar represents the recent time. This marks a period of sharing, but also of higher expenses, for all households.

Table 1: Seasonal calendar for the Greater Gaza Urban Zone



10. Zakat is the giving of a fixed portion of one's wealth as a tax, generally to the administration or government and is one of the Five Pillars of Islam.

2.2 Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone Description

2.2.1 General Description

The Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone comprises the areas shaded in green in Map 3. Most of the zone lies east of Salah Al-Dein Street with some smaller patches falling around the periphery of the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone. This zone also includes areas that fall within the buffer zone, including the 'no-go zone' or the area which spans 500 meters into the Gaza Territory from Israel's border fence, and the 'high-risk zone' which extends from 500 meters to 1000-1500 meters. Within the 'no-go zone' nothing is planted, whereas in the next 500-1000 meters some households plant fodder crops for their livestock. Beyond the 1000 meters there are citrus and olive trees and vegetable plots.

The zone's topography is mostly plain lands with small undulations. The majority of the zone is covered in farmlands, mixed with grasslands. In the south, near Rafah, it turns into more desert-like conditions, dry and sandy. Rainfall is the same as the neighbouring zones providing 300-400 mm of rain annually. The farmers in this zone primarily rely on rain to feed their olives and citrus trees and grain crops, but some farmers also have small-scale irrigation via hoses to produce vegetables such as cabbages, eggplants, chillies, cauliflowers and zucchinis. The water supply for irrigation comes from municipal water supplies and wells.

There are different methods of crop production according to the number of dunums a household owns and is capable of cultivating. Many households that cultivate smaller plots of land till their land by hand with hoes, and in some cases, households share this task with other households. Other households plough their land with donkeys, horses or camels, while larger farmers use tractors. Agricultural labouring is an essential income earning opportunity for many households in this zone and is split between planting, weeding and harvesting activities. Most of the work is usually done by the male household head and his son(s). Women do engage in agricultural labour, but mostly during the harvesting period. If additional labour is required, and can be afforded, the household employs local labourers, paying them cash wages.

Livestock ownership is common among households in this zone, but it is mostly limited to sheep, goats, poultry and equines rather than cattle. The latter are used to transport goods with a cart or, as previously mentioned, for ploughing. Cattle rearing on any scale is mainly done by professional herders or breeders.

The livelihood system here is of peri-urban agriculture. Most of the households live within the Semi-Agricultural Zone or in the urban periphery. Though the great majority of people in this zone engage in crop and livestock production, their livelihood is by no means exclusively rural. Their proximity to the urban zone and the associated markets influences the types income sources they have access to, as well as their expenditure patterns, notably for the foods they buy, which constitute by far the greater part of their overall food consumption. Some lower and upper middle households living in this zone have jobs with government organizations, NGOs, UN agencies and private companies based in the Urban Livelihood Zone. Like the pooper households most of the middle households' income come from agriculture production.

The border crossings at Erez and Kerem Shalom are within this zone. Erez is one of the main entry and exit points for people, along with Rafah located in the Urban Livelihood Zone. Kerem Shalom, is located in the Rafah portion of the Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone, and is the only official crossing point for commercial and humanitarian imports.

2.2.2 Provision of Services

Services in the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone are the same as those in the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone. Households source water from their municipal supply, but the main difference here is that those who live east of Salah Al-Dein Road also have access to wells. The water quality of both the well water and the municipal water is similar, i.e. salty. Drinking water is purchased from tankers at an estimated cost of 30 NIS per month. Unlike their urban neighbours, households in this zone are not connected to a sewer network. Garbage disposal is not as regular as it is in the urban zone but is a service provided by the municipality.

Throughout the zone, as everywhere in Gaza, the electricity supply is irregular. Nearly all residents have electricity in their residences, but the service is limited to 6-8 hours per day. As in the city, households and businesses that are able to afford the cost have generators to compensate for the irregularity of electricity. The situation and costs of health services and education are also the same as in the city.

2.2.3 Seasonal Calendar

The calendar below shows relevant activities for the Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone. Of course the rainy season in this agricultural zone has far more importance here than in the urban zone, given the reliance of most of the crops on direct rainfall rather than irrigation.

Typically in a rural livelihood zone the HEA reference year[11] starts with the harvest of the main crop produced. But for Gaza, since most households rely on

11. A defined period (typically 12 months) to which the livelihood baseline information refers, needed in order to analyse how changes in the future (in production, for example) can be defined in relation to the baseline.

the market to source the bulk of their food rather than on their own production, and the economy of this zone is partially dependent on the urban areas in terms of incomes, the research team used the same reference year as for the urban zone (November 2011 – October 2012).

Households in the Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone grow a variety of both annual, and perennial crops. The main crop produced in the zone is olives, which are harvested in October and November. During this period labourers find work harvesting in the olive groves of the larger land owners. Citrus, which is also an important crop for the zone's residents, offers income for land owners and employment opportunities for the zone's labour pool.

Poorer households have less capital and typically cultivate less land than wealthier households. They typically grow grains (wheat and to a lesser extent maize) strictly for household consumption. The harvest period for grains typically begins in May and can continue until August. Poorer household opt to cultivate grains because these typically require fewer inputs and can rely on rainfall rather than irrigation.

Vegetables are grown throughout Gaza but the zoning exercise revealed significant differences around Gaza in terms of production and variety. Households in the Semi-Agricultural zone do not cultivate crops using greenhouses. They grow vegetables that require minimal inputs such as eggplant, chillies, zucchini, cabbage, cauliflower and cucumber; they are for both home consumption and sale Households do not allocate all of their land to one type of crop, but rather rotate land between different crops within or between years. Cauliflower and cabbage are harvested in November through January, while eggplant and chillies are harvested twice per year: the first season starts in August and continues through November, and in the second season they are harvested in May and June. Other vegetables such as okra, zucchini and cucumber are also harvested in the summer months (May through August).

As the insecurity continues, households are opting to sow vegetables and grains rather than olives and citrus. This is because the seed, input cost associated with cultivating vegetables and grains and the water requirement, are relatively low compared to olives and citrus as is the labour investment. Also, the time it takes to harvest these short-cycle crops is shorter than the years it takes for a tree to start yielding fruit. Finally, many of the citrus and olive groves adjacent to the buffer zone have been destroyed by Israeli bulldozers and limits have been imposed to make sure that crops planted in these areas fall under a meter high.



3. Timeline of Events and Reference Year

3.1 Timeline

The timeline below is relevant for both the livelihood zones covered during this assessment and based on the many interviews held with key-informants.

3.2 Reference Year

HEA baseline data provides the socio-economic and livelihood profile of a population within a particular year. This set of reference information, against which future changes in access to income, food and non-food items may be monitored and analysed, is defined as the reference year. For this assessment, the reference year was November 2011 to October 2012. This was chosen because it was the most recent period without significant change to food and income access in Gazan terms: i.e there was no catastrophic event or change, but the inheritance of the economic events and constraints of previous years impinge on the current year situation. Again, the reference year does not signify a shock-free year, but rather a 12 month period that was relatively not influenced by any major event.

Year	Events
2007	- Blockade imposed - Palestinian political, social and economic crisis. Inflation and shortage of goods - Increased unemployment in all the Gaza governorates of the Gaza Strip - Wealthy families left Gaza to other countries - Gas and fuel shortages
2008	- Tunnel construction commenced, increased labour opportunities, goods imported but at very high prices (reached 4 or 5 times the original price) - Tunnel trading made some people rich as they benefited from the high inflation, those are “the crisis merchants” - December – Operation Cast Lead destroyed infrastructure, buildings, houses, wells, livestock, dropping of Phosphorus bombs - Households near the buffer zones displaced due to military conflict
2009	- Inflation continued - Increase in international assistance - After Operation Cast Lead some people repair their houses if they had the money - Increased psychological problems among children - bedwetting, trauma, nightmares, fears - Loss of both of the agricultural and industrial labour (factories) employment after the operation Cast Lead - High medicine prices due to low supply - Fishing blockage imposed to 3 nautical miles - Increase in the buffer zone
2010	- Inflation continued. - Number of tunnels increased. Also it became suitable to import cars, livestock, crops, etc. - Unemployment projects deployed - People cultivated trees in the neighbourhood , individual cleaning initiatives - Construction materials entered Gaza from the tunnels - New infrastructure projects in Deir Albalah. - Banks lost the financial liquidity due to the Israeli ban on the cash flows to Gaza (starting with the siege) No banks loans, as a result. - Many people sold their lands at low prices to bring the liquidity (in Deir Albalah) - Delegations brought aid - Price of goods traded via tunnels decreased - Mavi Marmara attempt to break the siege - Construction material and wedding costs reached the peak - Increase importation of consumer good through Kerem Shalom
2011	- Quality of the tunnels improved - For Alzaytoon: in March 2011 reconstruction started. Small sanitation project in the area. - Israeli side allowed only UNRWA to import the reconstruction materials - Construction materials prices decreased again - Overall 2011 was better than 2010: fuel availability, goods, etc. (but still difficult to get fuel).
2012	- Many foreign delegations backing the Palestinian people and attempting to break the siege (good moral support) - Prices came down yet land prices increased - Decreasing medicine prices (where available) - Economic situation improved partly thanks to UN construction projects with high demand for labour, however most positive effects felt in interior cities rather than buffer zones and nearby areas - Travelling via Rafah border became better, especially after regime change in Egypt

4. Market Analysis for the Gaza Strip

Market access in both the Greater Gaza Urban and the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zones is good. For the most part, households are capable of finding a wide variety of goods at any of the markets throughout the Strip. The market analysis is done from a consumer's point of view.

There are two main entry points for commercial goods to enter Gaza. The first is through the official crossing at Kerem Shalom, and the second is through the illegal tunnels in Rafah. The flow of goods does not fluctuate too much throughout the year except as Ramadan and Eid approach.

Figure 1: Staple food prices in NIS per 1 kg (Source: PCBS)



Most of the food goods that come through the Rafah tunnels are from Egypt, however some Israeli products also enter and are revered as higher quality and tend to be more expensive.

With the exception of vegetable oil[12] and lentils, staple food prices remained relatively stable from January 2010 until the end of the reference year of October 2012. The rather static price for staple foods suggests limited change in availability.

In Rafah, fuel is piped in via the tunnels and then filled into tanker trucks. The price for this fuel is cheaper than the fuel from Israel, but it is of poorer quality. The flow of fuel from Egypt to Rafah also depends on how strict the Egyptian government is at a given moment regarding tunnel trade activity. Most of the fuel from Israel comes through the Kerem Shalom border crossing. The closing of this border crossing has had major impact on the flow of goods into the Gaza Strip. The flow of fuel from Israel is contingent of the political situation between Gaza and the Israeli government.

Construction materials are another important commodity coming into Gaza, with the majority of construction goods coming from Egypt via the tunnels and a smaller portion coming from the Karem Shalom and Erez border crossing. Since the blockade, initially imposed in 2007, exports[13] from Gaza, crops, especially strawberries, cherry tomatoes, flowers and sweet peppers were once destined to Europe, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, has been banned.

The labour market can be separated into formal and informal. The formal labour market depends on government institutions, private companies, NGO and UN agencies as the main income providers.

In both livelihood zones there are a number of households that benefit from stable employment. The informal labour market consists of income earning opportunities that are more casual than permanent. For the majority of poorer households the lack of stable employment opportunities means that they must find varied ways of earning cash. This can be through petty trade, agricultural paid labour, collecting and selling recyclable goods, construction labour, etc.

The major problem in Gaza is not an absolute lack of food or non-food goods but rather a lack of viable and stable income earning opportunities. The chart below shows how the unemployment rate increased from 2006 until 2011 by Governorate. Political instability, conflict, and the blockade have all made an impact on Gaza's ability to grow its economy and to create job opportunities for its population. This in turn has affected household purchasing power.

Figure 2: Unemployment Rates in Gaza Strip[14]



The underground tunnels serve a major role in importing various commodities into Gaza and its effect on the local economy is widely considered as a life-line, especially after the Israeli blockade. Referred to as the tunnel economy, the illicit tunnel trade, already present since the 1990's became more intensified in 2007 when the Israeli

12. Due to increase in fuel price and associatedtransportation costs for traders. WFP 2011
13. Most of the exports goods originated from the Gaza High Production Agricultural Livelihood Zone
14. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

government imposed a blockade of all movements in and out Gaza and strict trade sanctions. The initial effect of the blockade caused a scarcity of essential goods such as food, fuel, clothes, etc. Therefore, residents began taking matters into their own hands, constructing tunnels and starting the 'illegal' supply of goods to satisfy local demand. As a result, the tunnels represented a profitable trade chain starting with Egyptian suppliers, via tunnel owners, to retailers within Gaza. From 2007 until 2010 the most common commodities to pass through the tunnels were food, clothes, electronics and fuel.

At the beginning food represented over half the goods passing through the tunnels and transportation of these goods, as well as the construction of new tunnels required large amounts of labour. As time passed and the tunnels became more sophisticated, some with electricity, transportation rails, etc. the need for tunnel labour decreased. After 2010 until the present, the biggest commodities passing through the tunnels were construction materials, mainly aggregate steel. In recent years, however, the Egyptian government has been acting to minimize this tunnel trade while at the same time Israeli Armed Forces intensified its bombing campaign. Despite these events the tunnels still serve as a crucial life-line to the people in the Gaza Strip.

5. Findings for the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone

5.1 Wealth Group Breakdown

In HEA, the Wealth Group breakdown disaggregates local populations based on local definitions of wealth. The main reason for conducting the wealth group breakdown is to analyse the access that different types of household have to food and cash income. Unlike in rural areas, in urban contexts like Gaza City, households typically source all of their food and non-food items from the market. On the other hand income sources are more diverse and more employment-based than in rural areas, and so instead of focusing on productive assets, in urban HEA studies more attention is given to income levels and expenditure patterns.

Figure 3: Wealth Group Breakdown



	Wealth group characteristics			
	HH size	Annual income range	Monthly income range	Income sources
Very poor	7 to 9	10,000 – 14,000 NIS	800 - 1150 NIS	This household typically has one person earning income. The income earned is from a range of sources mostly casual labor
Poor	7 to 9	15,000 – 20,000 NIS	1250 - 1650 NIS	This household typically has one or persons earning income. The income earned is from a range of sources mostly casual labor, petty trading, and self-
Lower-middle	7 to 9	22,000 – 26,000 NIS	1830 - 2160 NIS	Lower level salaried employment, shop keeper, small business
Upper-middle	7 to 8	39,000 – 43,000 NIS	3250 - 3580 NIS	Mid-level salaried employment or shop keepers

In the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone, mixed-gendered community leaders, mostly influential members of the community, identified five wealth groups in each of the sites studied: very poor, poor, lower middle, upper middle and better-off households. Given time constraints and in order to focus the study on households facing greater need, the HEA team only studied the first four wealth groups, excluding the better-off. Household representatives from each wealth group were interviewed in mixed-gendered focus groups[15]. Household sizes in the zone were relatively uniform across the wealth groups and across all the 16 sites surveyed: it was found that the majority of the households in the urban zone ranged between 7 to 9 members.

One of the significant differences across the wealth spectrum was the number of income sources and the availability of employment opportunities a household can engage in. This is either due to the lack of education and/or skills, the lack of capable intra-household labourers. The majority of very poor households have only one person earning an income. This income is not related to one single income generating activity, but many throughout the year. The very poor main earner of a household may engage in petty trade for part of the year, then work on an employment project, then work as a construction labourer. These households mostly also receive some sort of assistance from an UN agency, NGO or the Ministry of Social Affairs. For the most part, the labourers identified in the very poor households were male. Despite all their efforts to earn cash, very poor households still need to borrow money from neighbours and relatives to cover their essential needs.

Poor households are in a similar situation to their very poor neighbours but they may have an extra income earner or may have more regular employment for part of the year. Like the very poor, they receive some sort of external assistance and rely on credit and loans to compensate for income gaps.

Lower middle households may need to borrow or receive credit for part of the year but the amounts, both in absolute and proportional terms, are minimal compared to the poorer households. Some lower and upper middle households are involved in self-employment, trade and other businesses. This can include mechanics, appliance repairmen, shop-keepers, transporters, etc. Middle households are also able to invest in other assets, such as generators and electronics, and tuk-tuks and motorcycles that can either be rented out or used directly for income.

15. All wealth groups were asked if mixed-gendered focus groups were culturally appropriate. The vast majority of focus groups indicated no issue with mixed-gendered focus group wealth group interviews.

Better-off households represent a minority (roughly 1% to 3%), earning upwards of 50,000NIS per annum.

During the assessment the team also obtained estimates the percentage of female headed households in each wealth group. Data obtained from the key informant interview project that female headed households in the very poor, poor and lower middle categories are between 13% and 18%, whereas in the upper middle category they range between 10% and 15%.

5.2 Sources of Food

Figure 4: Source of Food



Figure 4 shows households' access to energy (in kilocalories) expressed as a percentage of the average recommended energy allowance using the common international standard of 2100 kcals per person per day (=100 %).[16] This is the level used in all previous HEA studies. In Gaza, an alternative allowance level of 2355 kcals per person per day is used by UNRWA, based on Palestinian data.[17]

Figure 5: Food deficits without food aid



The higher benchmark is the equivalent of 112% of the 2100 kcal pppd standard.

The results of the HEA study showed that households in all wealth groups typically exceeded the standard threshold of 2100 kcals. However the very poor fell just short of meeting the higher allowance, at 99% (equivalent to 111% of the 2100 kcals standard).

The market is the main source of food for all households in this zone. However the amount households are capable of purchasing depends the degree to which their income covers this and other essential expenditure. On their current income, very poor, poor and to a lesser degree lower-middle households will find it more difficult to meet their food energy needs without the assistance of food aid or cash aid.

Figure 5 shows the deficits when food aid at current levels is subtracted, looking at both energy benchmarks.

Except for the upper middle wealth group, households in all wealth groups show a food deficit without food assistance. Very poor households have a 40%-50% gap, the poor a 30%-40% gap, and the lower middle a 15%-25% gap.

The different kinds of food consumed by households in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone are shown in Figure 6. The graphic makes a distinction between the food purchased by the household and the food aid received. It breaks down the proportionate contribution to energy consumption as a percentage of requirements according to food type. It should be noted that this calculation only deals with the calorie values of the food: it does not measure micro-nutrients and it is not offered as a full analysis of dietary diversity.

Figure 6: Composition of Diet (kacals)



16. Human Energy Requirements: Report of a joint FAO/WHO/UNU Expert Consultation, Rome 2001 This refers to the recommended level of energy intake for a developing country rural population, i.e. the mean energy requirement of the healthy, well-nourished individuals who constitute the population, taking into account the age and sex and weight distribution typical for such a population. The equivalent calculation for an 'industrialised county profile' is 2180 kcal pppd.
17. Poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) 2009-2007 (Summary Report) Ibrahim M. Hejoj and Adnan Badran, UNRWA 2011. UNRWA has calculated a reference figure for the Palestinian population based on the same methodology as WHO but with data on average body weights of Palestinians from a survey by Al-Quds University, and Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) evidence of the actual age/sex breakdown of the Palestinian population. In one respect the two thresholds are not quite comparable, since the WHO calculation is based on a population with adults engaged in light activity, while the UNRWA figure is based on a population with adults engaged in moderate activity. However, the difference between the two figures also derives from the fact that the Palestinian population is distinctly heavier than the WHO reference population.

Purchased cereals in the form of wheat, rice and bread account for the bulk of all households' diets, followed by sugar and oil (a combination of vegetable oil and olive oil). The contribution of vegetables remains similar across all four wealth groups while meat and dairy increases, but only markedly for the upper middle.

Food aid cereals also make up a large portion of the diet of households other than the upper middle; combined with cereals purchased, cereals represent over 50% of the overall diet in calorie terms.

Figure 7 shows the average cost of the foods the very poor and poor households consume. The figures for food aid are shown in pattern texture and was calculated using the amount of food aid distributed multiplied by the cost of the commodity if it were bought at the market.

For both very poor and poor households cereals, vegetables and meat represent the highest proportions of expenditure on food. Meat expenditure, which includes frozen beef, chicken, fish and eggs account for roughly 2,100 NIS per year for the very poor, which is between 30-35% of their food expenditure and nearly 3,200 NIS per year for the poor, which is approximately 35-40% of their food expenditure. In circumstances where they were forced to make choices, e.g. diminished income or rations, reducing the meat purchases alone, especially frozen beef (approx. 23 NIS per KG) would allow for substantially more purchase of cheaper calories such as wheat. In fact, if the very poor were to use all 2100 NIS that in the baseline year went to meat to buy wheat they would cover approximately 55-60% of their recommended annual energy needs. If they were instead to buy lentils this would cover between 20-25% of their energy needs. Likewise the investment in vegetable purchases is also high but accounts for a very small percentage of household energy needs. But although reducing vegetable purchase to pay for less expensive, higher calorie foods might be relevant to an emergency situation, a balanced diet would be threatened over any but a short time-period.

Figure 7: Cost of food sources in NIS for Very Poor and Poor Households



The cost for very poor and poor households to achieve their annual energy needs and cover their deficits is displayed in Table 3. Wheat, rice, oil, sugar and lentils are included in this mixed basket; therefore the table below will shows the quantities needed to meet energy requirements and the cost in NIS. The values in Table 3 show the deficit that would need to be covered by households if they did not receive food aid.

If food aid were taken out of the household diet it would cost very poor households an average of 1,200 NIS to meet their annual energy needs of 2100 kcals and an average of 970 NIS to meet the same energy needs of poor households.

Table 3: Cost of meeting energy needs without food aid (per person per year)

	% of deficit w/o food aid		Quantity needed (KG)		Price/kg	Total cost in NIS	
	2100 kcals	2355 kcals	2100 kcals	2355 kcals		2100 kcals	2355 kcals
Very poor	34-39%	46-51%	447-513 kg	678-752 kg	2.5 NIS	1118 -1282 NIS	1696 -1880 NIS
Poor	27-32%	39-44%	355-420 kg	575- 649kg	2.5 NIS	887-1052 NIS	1438-1622 NIS

5.3 Sources of Income

Figure 8 to the left shows the mid-point of the income range in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) for the different wealth groups in the reference year. Since the income sources in urban communities typically vary greatly, it difficult to pinpoint the exact labour activity for each household.

Table 4 shows the income range associated with each wealth group for the year and per capita. It also highlights the average income per capita per day. This shows that the average income per capita per day for most households is higher than the World Bank's poverty threshold of $1.25 USD. The very poor fall below this poverty threshold as they are at $1.05 USD.

It should be noted that the income sources for the very poor and the poor above include cash assistance from local government and NGO's and include loans that are received from family and friends.

Figure 8: Average annual income range in NIS



Table 4: Annual and per capita income range by wealth group in NIS and USD[18]

Currency	Very Poor	Poor	Lower Middle	Upper Middle
NIS annual	10,000 – 14,000	15,000 – 20,000	22,000 – 26,000	39,000 – 43,000
NIS annual w/o cash assistance	6,800 – 10,800	11,400 – 16,400	n/a	n/a
NIS per capita annual	1,250 – 1,750	1,875 – 2,500	2,750 – 3250	5,200 – 5,733
NIS per capita per day (avg)	4.11	5.99	8.22	14.98
USD annual	≈2,560 – 3,585	≈3,840 – 5,120	≈5,630 – 6,660	≈9,990 – 11,585
USD per capita	≈320 – 450	≈480 – 640	≈700 – 830	≈1,300 – 1,470
USD per capita per day	1.05	1.54	2.11	3.84

Figure 9 displays average sources of income in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) by wealth group for the reference year. Note: given the diverse income sources of households in the same wealth group in urban areas, the variations in the graph should be seen as indicative of their patterns of income.

Insufficient income earning opportunities is the main hindrance to food and livelihood self-sufficiency in this livelihood zone. Though the very poor and poor households earn cash from a variety of casual labour and self-employment activities (see Table 5 below), over half of their income comes from cash assistance[19], credit, remittances, and/or gifts (loans). These 'loans' are not really loans since they are not generally expected to be paid back. They are more like a gift tactfully given. Households will receive 'loans'/gifts throughout the year mostly from family members. The example in Figure 9 does not disaggregate gifts, remittances and credit since they are combined in very varied proportions within wealth group. When loan/gift receiving households are able they will invite the giving party over to express appreciation or provide some type of in-kind service as repayment. Credit is also categorized here but it is typical that they repay at least a portion of the debt to the creditor to maintain access to further credit. This translates into more borrowing and increase debt from one year to the next.

18. Exchange rates taken from Oanda.com. This is an average exchange rate for the reference year. 1 USD = 3.9035 NIS
19. This information in not disaggregated but is an average of the different types of cash assistance provided by the local government or NGOs

For some this translates into a gradual increase of total debt. The ability to pay back creditors is very individualistic and therefore is difficult to typify how much is paid back. Cash remittances are very much less common, although they do make some small contribution especially among the very poor households. Remittances as a proportion of household income are similar to what is understood from PCBS data. Comparing PCBS's fifth quintile figures, which refer to the poorest groups in Gaza, with the HEA study very poor wealth group, we see roughly similar percentages[20]. Very poor households get roughly 9% of their income from remittances, very comparable to 12% recorded for the fifth quintile in PCBS data. Poor households gain roughly 6.5% of their total income from remittances which is again not far from the 4% recorded for the fourth quintile in the PCBS figures. For both the HEA lower and upper middle wealth groups and the PCBS third and second quintiles the figures are not more than 3%. It may seem surprising that remittances are not more significant in view of the great Palestinian diaspora and the economic hardships of their kin in Palestine. In the past remittances were more important for Palestinians in Gazas, but since 2008 remittances have fallen. Global recession may have contributed to this too. However, instead of receiving cash, household do receive non-monetary goods i.e. construction materials, electronics, furniture, etc. from relatives.

Lower middle households earn most of their income from salaried employment or they are small-scale business owners or traders. They too may seek loan or remittances from others, but the

Table 5: Examples of casual labour and self-employment

Casual Labour	Self-employment
Construction	Metal scrappers
Agriculture	Vegetable sales
Shop helper	Petty trading
Transporter/porter	Transporter – owned tuk-tuk
Taxi driver – not owners	Small shop owners
Watchman	Repair man
Tunnel worker	Barber

amounts are not as much as that required by the very poor and poor. Upper middle households mostly get all of their income from salaried employment, but some own a small business.

Most of the salaried employment is either from Government institutions, NGOs, UN agencies or the private sector. Within the government some workers are paid by the Palestinian Authority in Gaza while others are paid by the Palestinian Authority based in Ramallah. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Gaza's employed labour force is about 68%[21] of the active population. Out of this figure 40% are employed in the public sector and the remainder are employed in the private sector (including NGOs and UN).

Figure 9: Example of Sources of Income



According to PCBS data 17% of females participate in the Gazan workforce and 44% of females are unemployed. The HEA study found that in the very poor and poor wealth groups most females are engaged in self-employment opportunities such as petty-trading (prepared food sales, vegetable sales, etc.). A minority of females perform casual labour, which is limited to domestic labour jobs. Cultural restrictions on women participating in the workforce is the main limitation in finding work. In lower and upper middle households, women do engage in formal employment. This is mostly in government and NGO salaried jobs and the private sector. In some cases, women in the formal workforce most be chaperoned by a male family member.

5.4 Expenditure Patterns

Like income, expenditure patterns are essential in understanding how household economies operate. One of the main differences in wealth is how households allocate income to cover essential and non-essential needs. The graphs below show expenditure patterns in two different ways. The first graphic show annual expenditure as a percentage of the total amount spent whereas the second graphic shows absolute expenditure.

In Figure 10, moving from the very poor to the upper-middle, one can see that expenditure on food (staple and non-staple), represents the biggest expenditure for the poorer two groups but reduces markedly as a proportion for the wealthier. Household items, which include a

20. This is offered only as a ballpark comparison. The HEA data refers to a typical household in the very poor category, as described by focus groups. The PCBS data offers the average value for all households in the fifth quintile.
21. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps

range of goods like soap, detergents, diapers sanitary products, spices, salt, etc., account for another important proportion of cash allocation. 'Other' represents one or more of the following: cigarettes, phone credit, internet access, religious contributions, etc.

Figure 10: Expenditure Patterns - Relative



Figure 11 shows actual amounts of cash typically spent on each item. The sum spent on food, especially non-staples, increases with wealth. For the most part, lower and upper middle households opt to purchase higher quality foods. For example, where the poorer households may buy frozen chicken wings, the wealthier households will buy higher quality cuts of poultry and fresh rather than frozen. This also holds true for other items such as soaps and detergents. Poorer households will buy the cheaper brands whereas the middle households will buy higher quality brands, mostly imported from Israel. Social service expenditure also increases with wealth. This may include more pocket money for school students, university fees and higher quality stationery. Transportation cost for lower middle and upper middle households is also higher since they tend to spend more on taxis to travel to and from work or pay for fuel for their own motorcycle or vehicle.

Figure 11: Expenditure Patterns - Absolute



5.5 Survival and Livelihood Protection Thresholds

Total food and cash income are compared against two thresholds. The survival threshold represents total food and cash income needed to cover the cost of 2,100 Kcals (or 2,355 Kcals) of food per person per day and the non-food items necessary for survival. This threshold can be seen as the point in which households become undernourished from a caloric standpoint. The livelihoods protection (i.e. maintenance) threshold includes the survival threshold plus over and beyond the expenditure required to sustain local livelihoods in the mid to long term.

Usually in HEA analysis the survival threshold is the amount of food and cash income required to ensure survival in the short-term, i.e. to cover minimum food and non-food needs. Again, HEA looks at survival from a food-energy perspective, and not with reference micro-nutrient deficiencies. In its inception, HEA was a response to acute food insecurity in rural Africa. The survival threshold calculation in that context uses the cheapest grain usually consumed to calculate food needs, and also includes the essential costs of preparation and cooking (e.g. milling and fuel) plus any expenditure on water for human consumption.

The survival context in Gaza is different in many ways, but mainly because the threat of acute food insecurity, i.e. a situation where households cannot meet their minimum food energy needs, is unlikely. The Gaza situation may be seen as a continuous 'emergency': at all events the provision of food or cash assistance to households is relatively continuous year in and year out, and so the 'survival' food basket should reflect the long-term situation and cannot be limited to the single cheapest source of calories. To reflect this the survival threshold used in the Gaza analysis includes a mixed food basket consisting of wheat, rice, oil, sugar and lentils[22]. Expenses on cooking fuel, soap and water are also included under the survival threshold.

The composition of the survival threshold can be modified should decision makers wish to define deficits in relation to a different standard of living. The basic basket used by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics consists of the following items: bread, cereals, meat, poultry, fish, seafood, dairy, eggs, oils, fats, fruits, nuts, vegetables, sugars, non-alcoholic beverages, salt, spices, clothing, foot wear and housing. As it stands now the survival basket for the poor in this zone is approximately 28% of their total expenditure or roughly

22. NOTE: During the establishment of the survival basket some stakeholders at the Outcome Analysis exercise requested all the types of purchased food (including all vegetables and meat, on each of which poorer households spend a substantial portion of their food budget) to be included in the survival basket, extending the same argument as above regarding the long-term nature of the situation. A compromise suggestion was to include onions, tomatoes, salt and spices. The extra cost represented by an expanded the survival basket would of course push up the survival threshold and potentially increase instances of livelihood protection and survival deficits in scenarios of shock.

3,400 NIS/month. The estimated cost of including the items listed in PCBS's basic basket would be roughly three times that amount.

The contents of PCBS's basic basket broadly parallels the contents found in the livelihoods protection basket. Given that the situation in the Gaza Strip is more of a protracted emergency rather than an acute emergency it makes sense that agencies do not look so much at ensuring the basic survival but hone their efforts at maintaining and protecting livelihoods.

Table 6 shows the proportion of calories each item in the survival basket contributes to the total ration. The rations below are standardized between this livelihood zone and the Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone. The figures in table 6 represent a poor household with 8 members and come from the HEA field data on actual consumption. The percentages below derive from the quantity of the commodity (kg/year) and multiply it by its calorie value of the commodity and then divide by the annual kilocalorie needs of the household. The second part of table 6 offers the same calculation on the average food ration. If we compare the percentages with the intake goal recommendations from WHO/FAO[23] for calories from different nutrients,, the proportion from carbohydrates, i.e. from wheat flour, rice and to some extent lentils, is high while fats are lower than the WHO/FAO range but sugar is within the recommended limit. These values would of course go down if the other food households consume (vegetables, meat etc.) were included in the basket. Comparing the food aid ration to the recommendations we find that carbohydrates and fats are within the recommended range and sugar is again under the limit (the dairy contribution is insignificant in calorie terms, but important in other dietary terms). However, unlike the survival basket the ration is not supposed to cover the household calorie requirement (in fact it covers 41%. It is of course expected that people purchase food too, so that the overall percentages of calories from different nutrients will change somewhat.

The second threshold used in the analysis is the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. This includes the total expenditure required to sustain local livelihoods in the mid to long term. As defined in the Greater Gaza Urban Zone context, this includes non-staple foods (meat, vegetables, dairy, fruit, etc.), tea, household items, transportation, clothing, credit repayment, school costs, and medicine. NOTE: UNRWA subsidizes primary education and health services for the majority of Gaza's population. Therefore the Livelihoods Protection Threshold is already influenced by external assistance.

Table 6: Proportion of Calories in the Survival Basket and Current Food Ration

Survival Basket	Wheat flour	Rice	Oil	Sugar	Lentils
Kg/year	1390	89	54	92	54
Kcals/kg	3440	3450	9000	4000	3430
% kcals	78%	5%	8%	6%	3%
Food Aid Basket[24]					
Kg/year	500	32	40	40	N/A
Kcals/kg	3440	3450	9000	4000	3430
% kcals	71	4.5	15	3%	
WHO/FAO recommendation	Carbo-hydrates	Fats	Sugar		
	55%-75%	15-30%	<10%		

23. Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases: report of a joint WHO/FAO Expert Consultation. WHO Technical Report Series No.916, Geneva 2003

24. Since some households receive WFP rations and others receive UNRWA rations an average was taken from the field data to come up with the figures listed here. Therefore, these figures represent the ration that the majority of 'poor' households receive.

Table 7 provides a breakdown of the cost of each threshold from the reference year for a 'poor' household (8 people).

The survival basket is divided into food and non-food, while the livelihoods protection basket is divided between all other food, water, education and other livelihoods protection (clothing, transportation, medicine, etc).

Outcome Analysis in HEA is a method for predicting the effect of a given shock on the basis of the baseline data for the 'normal' household economy. In this scenario analysis account is also taken of people's likely coping activity.

The outcome analysis is then measured against the livelihood protection and the survival thresholds to see if there are deficits, and if so the quantified 'gap' that would need to be filled by agency assistance with food or cash. Scenarios developed for Gaza are discussed in Section 9.

Table 7: Cost of Survival and Livelihoods Protection in the Reference Year

Survival Basket	Cost in Israeli Shekels
Survival food	4200 NIS[25]
Survival non-food	1967 NIS
Survival Total	6167 NIS
Livelihoods Prot. Basket	
Other foods	5394 NIS
Education	1505 NIS
Other livelihoods protection	570 NIS
Livelihood Protection Total	7469 NIS
Livelihood Prot. Threshold (Survival plus Livelihoods Protection Baskets)	13636 NIS
Other expenditure	3180 NIS
GRAND TOTAL	16816 NIS

6. Findings for the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone

6.1 Wealth Group Breakdown

Figure 12 above highlights the wealth characteristics for the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Livelihood Zone. Like the Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone, five wealth groups were identified during the community leader interviews, however time limitations and agency interest prioritized the very poor, poor, lower middle and upper middle households and excluded the better-off (roughly 1% to 3% of the population) from the study.

Since this zone is highly influenced by the urban economy in terms of incomes, weight is given to household income rather than defining wealth on the basis of land cultivated alone. But it is notable that the area of land cultivated increases sharply with wealth. Note: land cultivated does not necessarily equal land owned. Some households own land inside the buffer zone which they do not cultivate; other households own no land but rent dunums from land owners for cultivation.

Very poor households cultivate between one and three dunums. They mostly sow wheat and maize for house-

Figure 12: Wealth Group Breakdown



Wealth group characteristics				
HH size	Annual income range	Monthly income range	Cultivated land	Types of income
6 to 8	8,000 – 12,000 NIS	650 - 1000 NIS	1-3 dunums	Agricultural labour, casual labour, cash assistance
6 to 8	13,000 – 17,000 NIS	1080 - 1400 NIS	4-5 dunums	Agricultural labour, crop sales, casual labour, cash assistance
6 to 8	18,500 – 22,500 NIS	1550 - 1880 NIS	6-8 dunums	Crop sales, livestock sales, self emploment, or salaried employment
6 to 8	28,000 – 33,000 NIS	2330 - 2750 NIS	10+ dunums	Crop sales, livestock sales, self emploment, or salaried employment

25. cf. food basket explanation on page 35

hold consumption and allocate part of their land to producing low input vegetables such as zucchini, eggplant and chillies. They sell a portion of these vegetables after the harvest and consume the remainder. Since they have smaller plots they hand-till their land using labour from within the household and sometimes sharing the task with other very poor households. Typically one household member, usually the male-head or an older son, also seeks casual work in the urban areas or performs paid agricultural labour for a wealthier household.

Poor households are similar to the very poor terms of their economic activities, but they typically have more land, and growing cereals and vegetables for food and for sale. They tend also to have more labour capacity in the household, allowing them to search for additional labour opportunities. Some own equines that can be used to plough their land, transport goods to the market and help petty trading.

Both lower and upper middle households have larger land holdings and are engaged in more regular work, either in salaried employment or in types of businesses. The steady employment gives them a stable source of income which allows them to grow more and a wider range of vegetables, which they sell in the market. They also have the capacity to hire external labourers to perform agricultural activities.

The poorer households and the lower middle households also typically take credit. This is usually used to buy agricultural inputs: fertilizers, seeds, pesticides etc. The credit is repaid in cash once they harvested their crops.

6.2 Sources of Food

The ability for households in this zone to produce some of their own food takes the burden off the amount of food they must purchase at the market. However they still meet the bulk of their food needs through purchase, while food aid rations amount to more than their crops. Taking into account all their food sources, on average households in each wealth group typically meet their annual food energy needs, even using the higher allowance of 2355 kcal pppd (see Section 5.2 above).

Figure 13: Sources of Food



Figure 14: Dietary Composition



The breakdown of households' sources of food is shown in Figure 13. Dietary composition is shown in Figure 14 shows Here we can see that across all wealth groups cereals, whether purchased or from rations, account for a large portion of their diets. For the most part this cereal is wheat but also includes rice and pasta to a smaller degree. Pulses, such as chickpeas, lentils and fava beans and vegetables and fruit represent smaller portions of the diet when compared to grains but are important for a balanced and palatable diet. As in the urban zone sugar and oil constitute substantial secondary sources of food energy. Except for the upper-middle households, food aid accounts for over a third of household energy intake.

Figure 15 shows the average cost of the foods the very poor and poor households consume. The figures for food aid are shown in pattern texture and nominal cost was calculated according to the cost of the commodity if bought in the market. Items included in the staple basket are shaded in blue.

As in the urban zone both very poor and poor households spend most of their food budget on cereals, vegetables and meat. The proportion spent on each item is less than that spent in the urban areas since they also are able to produce cereals and vegetables on their plots. Therefore the graphic does not represent all food sources, since it naturally does not include food produced on farms which is consumed 'free' rather than purchased.

Meat expenditure, which accounts for 1,300 NIS per year for the very poor, 22% of their food expenditure, and nearly 2,300 NIS per year for the poor, 33% of their food expenditure. This would very likely be one of the first items to be reduced if for any reason households were under increased budgetary pressure. If the very poor were to take the amount of cash they spend on meat (1,300 NIS) and purchase wheat they could be about 1,150 kgs or 64% of their recommended annual energy needs. If they were to only purchase lentils with the 1,300 NIS they spend on meat, they could buy about 380 kgs or 21% of their recommended annual energy needs.

Figure 15: Cost of food sources in NIS for Very Poor and Poor Households



6.3 Sources of Income

Figure 16 below shows the different sources and amounts of income (in NIS)_that made up the total cash earnings of typical households in the four wealth groups in the reference year. All households sell a part of the crops they produce for cash. The proportion, and of course absolute amount, that they sell depends on the type of crop as well as the number of dunums the cultivate. Very poor and poor households produce much less than the wealthier farmers and consume most of the cereals crops they produce, but sell a somewhat higher proportion of their vegetables, sometimes pushed by their high perishability (although some they give to kin and friends as gifts): altogether their sales income is very low. The middle households cultivate more dunums and therefore allocate more land to the production of citrus and olives. They have the capital to invest in the needed inputs and to hire external labourers to help with various tasks.

Very poor and poor households must work for others to get the bulk of income to cover their needs. Most find agricultural labouring opportunities on the larger farms and groves and orchards. Others find work in the urban zone performing a range of activities. They are also sometimes engaged in periodic employment projects or receive direct benefits from MOSA.

Lower middle household also gain the bulk of their earnings from employment, although at a higher level whether salaried running their own enterprises. Typically at least one member has steady employment, usually in lower level government, an NGO, the UN or a private company. The upper middle household typically has one member at a higher level of employment. They sell considerably more crops, making up nearly half of their income, and their sales of poultry and sheep/goats is significant.

Figure 16: Sources of Cash



Table 8 shows the per capita income range associated with each wealth group for the year. It also shows the average income per capita per day – and this for households other than the very poor is typically higher than the World Bank's poverty threshold of $1.25 USD. The very poor fall below this poverty threshold at $1.00 USD per day.

This is 0.05 USD lower than for the very poor households in the urban zone, but in fact the rural households actually earn more in terms of work, since the bulk of their cash comes from employment and crops sales rather than loans/remittances and cash assistance.

Table 8: Annual and per capita income range by wealth group in NIS and USD[26]

Currency	Very Poor	Poor	Lower Middle	Upper Middle
NIS annual	8,000 – 12,000	13,000 – 17,000	18,500 – 22,500	28,000 – 33,000
NIS per capita annual	1,140 – 1,700	1,850 – 2,225	2,640 – 3200	4,000 – 7,700
NIS per capita per day (avg)	3.91	5.87	8.02	11.94
USD annual	≈2,050 – 3,075	≈3,330 – 4,355	≈4,740 – 5,765	≈7,175 – 8,450
USD per capita	≈290 – 440	≈475 – 620	≈675 – 820	≈1,025– 1,200
USD per capita per day	1.00	1.50	2.05	3.05

6.4 Expenditure Patterns

Figure 17 shows typical annual household expenditure in proportionate terms. It is clear that the poorer you are, the more overwhelming is you expenditure just on food and basic everyday items to keep the household going. Only the upper middle manage to spend less than half of their budget on these. This is on top of the rations received, which result in the low expenditure on staple food across the board compared with the other foods that give dietary diversity and quality.

Otherwise the thing that stands out is the great proportion of the budget of the upper middle that goes on production inputs (which includes fertilizers, seeds and hire of labour and expenditure on livestock raising): it is worth it because the returns form well over half of their income. Poorer people are more constrained by other expenditure needs and presumably cannot maximise production on such land as they cultivate.

Figure 18 demonstrates expenditure patterns in terms of the actual NIS spent on each category. For the lower and upper middle income groups, the amount of cash spent on food is greater than the other wealth groups, indicating a better quality of diet. Social services, transport and other is another high category for expenditure, but again the most striking difference is expenditure on inputs. 'Other' here represent non-essential expenses like cigarettes, phone credit, internet costs, religious contributions, etc.

Figure 17: Expenditure Patterns - Relative



Figure 18: Expenditure Patterns - Absolute



26 Exchange rates taken from Oanda.com. This is an average exchange rate for the reference year. 1 USD = 3.9035 NIS

6.5 Survival and Livelihood Protection Thresholds

The rationale and all the factors for these thresholds are the same as for the urban zone (see Section 5.5). But there is one difference in the items found in livelihoods protection basket for the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone: here water and inputs for agriculture are added.

Table 9 provides a breakdown of the cost of each threshold in the reference year for a 'poor' household. The survival basket is divided into food and non-food, while the livelihoods protection basket is divided between all other food, water, education and other livelihoods protection (clothing, transportation, medicine, etc).

Table 9: Cost of Survival and Livelihoods Protection in the Reference Year

Survival Basket	Cost in Israeli Shekels
Survival food	2528 NIS
Survival non-food	2327 NIS
Survival Total	4855 NIS
Livelihoods Protection Basket	
Other foods	2304 NIS
Education	1645 NIS
Inputs	1400 NIS
Other livelihoods protection	1080
Livelihood Protection Total	6429 NIS
Other expenditure	3728 NIS
GRAND TOTAL	15012 NIS

7. Livelihood Hazards

The main hazards to access to food and income are common to both zones. Conflict was reported as the main impediment resulting in decreased access to market, disruption of commodity flows into Gaza and hindered access to cash. Conflict in this sense is more related to major military operations executed by the Israeli Armed Forces, such as in 2008 and 2012. Increase in staple food prices is the second most felt hazard reported in both zones, since all household rely so heavily on market purchases to meet their food needs.

The last two hazards are specific to the Semi-Agricultural Zone. The first is the influx of exotic pests and diseases that disrupt normal crop and animal production. The tunnels helped serve as a lifeline to a population already limited by the blockade but as commodities move through the tunnels they are not checked for diseases and pests that can plague domestic production. Similarly, the influx of cheaper and poorer quality agricultural goods hurt local farmers since they are often unable to compete with low prices and have increased input costs.

Table 10: Hazards

Greater Gaza Urban Livelihood Zone	Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone
Conflict escalation and blockade	Conflict escalation and blockade
Increase in staple food prices	Increase in staple food prices
Sickness or permanent loss of main income earner	Pest and disease imported from tunnels Disruption of cash crop marketing Sickness or permanent loss of main income earner

8. Coping Strategies

The main hazards to access to food and income are common to both zones. Conflict was reported as the main impediment resulting in decreased access to market, disruption of commodity flows into Gaza and hindered access to cash. Conflict in this sense is more related to major military operations executed by the Israeli Armed Forces, such as in 2008 and 2012. Increase in staple food prices is the second most felt hazard reported in both zones, since all household rely so heavily on market purchases to meet their food needs.

The last two hazards are specific to the Semi-Agricultural Zone. The first is the influx of exotic pests and diseases that disrupt normal crop and animal production. The tunnels helped serve as a lifeline to a population already limited by the blockade but as commodities move through the tunnels they are not checked for diseases and pests that can plague domestic production. Similarly, the influx of cheaper and poorer quality agricultural goods hurt local farmers since they are often unable to compete with low prices and have increased input costs.

The identification of coping strategies that households would apply in times of shocks or the hazards mentioned above is part of the HEA Outcome Analysis. Understanding how households respond to hazards provides insights into the opportunities and constraints for the expandability of food and income options for different types of household. Gauging coping and its limits may help the determination of supportive responses from agencies. However, there is

limited scope in an HEA baseline study to collect, and especially to quantify, coping strategy information. It is recommended that additional field information be collected in a follow-up study to further explore the quantification of coping strategies and to verify the information collected during the baseline study. The following coping strategies were identified during the baseline study:

- Purchase of cheaper lower quality of foods or brands
- Purchase of food on credit
- Seeking assistance from religious institutions
- Delay or default on bills
- Reducing expenditure on non-essential items
- Selling animals (Semi-Agricultural Zone)
- Increase petty trading activity
- Increased sharing and borrowing from relatives and neighbours
- Increased collection of recycled materials for sale

One resource for comparison is the Coping Strategy Index (CSI), developed by Care. CSI has been used in many contexts, mostly Africa, as a rapid measure of household food insecurity and to establish behavioural responses to food shortages[27]. Each coping strategy identified is measured by frequency and severity and is linked to "that behaviour in the index and each of these individual behavioural scores are then summed to generate a total index score for the household."

Table 11 shows the Consumption Coping Strategies for the Gaza Strip. The results of the CSI add somewhat to the coping strategies information collected during the HEA. For example, the first two strategies listed in the HEA results may be linked with CSI's coping strategy number 6 : 'Purchase of Low Quality Market 'leftovers'. It is of interest also to try to identify strategies relative to a particular wealth group. This is not part of the CSI methodology, and we have to make guesses. For instance, in the CSI index we see that the first coping strategy listed is "Eaten stored food". This strategy has a mild severity category and a severity weight of one. This low score suggests 'less extensive coping or less food insecurity'. From the HEA, we may assume that this strategy is mostly used by middle or better-off households. Firstly, they tend to be less food insecure than their poorer neighbours, and secondly one can assume that financial security from regular employment makes them more likely to be capable of storing food in any substantial amount.

Table 11: CSI Coping Strategy Index for Gaza [28]

Severity Category	Consumption Coping Strategies GS	Severity Weight
Mild	1 - Eaten stored food أكل المواد الغذائية المخزونة	1
	2 - Picked wild plants (khobeza, hamasees, halayoon) جمع نباتات برية للاستهلاك (مثل : الخبيزة و الحماصيص و الهليون)	1
Moderate	3 - Stopped eating expensive foods and chosen alternatives التوقف عن أكل الطعام باهظ الثمن و التوجه إلى اختيار البدائل	3
	4 - Reduced number of meals by all household members تقليل عدد الوجبات المستهلكة لجميع أفراد الأسرة	3
	5 - Adults eaten smaller portions to be able to feed children تقليل كمية الطعام للبالغين لتوفيرها للاطفال	3
	6 - Purchased low quality market "leftovers" شراء الخضراوات ذات جودة منخفضة من السوق (بقايا آخر وقت من السوق)	3
Severe	7 - Reduced amount eaten in meals by all household members تقليل كمية الطعام في الوجبة الواحدة لكل افراد الأسرة	6
	8 - Adults skipped meals to be able to feed children استغناء البالغين عن بعض الوجبات من أجل إطعام الاطفال	6
	9 - Food on credit/borrowed from relatives or supermarkets الدين/ الاقتراض من الأقارب أو السوبر ماركت لأجل الطعام	6
	10 - Sent children elsewhere to eat/regrouped family members for meals إرسال الأطفال للأكل في مكان آخر / تجمع أفراد العائلة على الوجبات الجماعية	6
Very Severe	11 - Dangerous/undesirable/illegal jobs or activities (such as working in tunnels, begging or rubble collection in the buffer zone) ممارسة الاعمال الخطرة /غير المرغوبة /غير الشرعية للحصول على المال لشراء الطعام (مثل العمل في الأنفاق ، التسول، جمع الحجارة و الحصى من المناطق العازلة (الحدودية) .....الخ)	8
	12 - Sent females (women or girls) to serve at homes إرسال النساء و الفتيات للعمل في خدمة المنازل	8

27 Technical Report: Coping Strategy Index (CSI) Development: Construction of CSI Survey Tools for use in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. CARE WBG 2011.
28. CARE

Though CSI is potentially a helpful addition to the HEA coping data, it is not specific to livelihood zones or wealth groups and it does not include certain coping strategies that are important for a more robust analysis. For example, it does not include the switching expenditure patterns from non-food items to food items. To get a more detailed understanding and quantification of coping strategies, inter alia in order to refine scenario analysis, more field information will be needed. This research could be done during the HEA follow-up phase planned for 2013.

HEA's initial application was an early operational expression of the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) formula, which is express as: R (the risk of disaster) is a function of H (hazard) and V (vulnerability), mitigated by C (capacity to cope); or R=f(H,V)/C.[29] The HEA baseline is a set of field information that inter alia reveals a population's vulnerability to different hazards (V) and its ability to cope with them (C). The 'outcome analysis' procedures of HEA combine information about real or projected hazards (H) with the baseline information to estimate the likely risk (R) of food security and livelihood disasters. Acting to reduce disaster risks is helped by our ability to employ an analytical framework that incorporates these core components and links them together in a logical, coherent and systematic way[30]. Though the HEA baseline in the Gaza Strip was not aimed to focus on DRR, the data can be used to inform decision makers and policies on resilience building.

9. Outcome Analysis and Applications

9.1 Outcome Analysis Overview

One objective of HEA is to investigate the effects of hazards on future access to food and income, so that decisions can be taken about the most appropriate types of intervention to implement. The rationale behind the approach is that a good understanding of how people have survived in the past provides a sound basis for projecting into the future. Three types of information are combined for the analysis; information on baseline access, information on hazard (i.e. factors affecting access to food/ income, such as crop production or market prices) and information on coping strategies (i.e. the sources of food and income that people turn to when exposed to a hazard). The approach can be summarized as follows: Baseline + Hazard + Coping = Outcome

The previous sections highlight the items that were included in the livelihood protection and survival basket for each of the Livelihood Zones covered in the Gaza Assessment. More information on both these thresholds can be found in Annex 2.

In April 2013 Oxfam hosted a five-day outcome analysis training. Representatives from Accion Contra le Faim, UNRWA, WFP, and FAO participated in the training. The purpose of the scenario analysis exercise was two-fold: 1) to run a series of scenarios using the HEA baseline data and, 2) to train stakeholders how to use the two analytical tools developed for Gaza.

9.2 Gaza Outcome Analysis

The HEA toolkit includes a dedicated spreadsheet which links to the baseline data and calculates the predicted effects of defined shocks on people's food access and livelihoods. The system allows the specification of a 'Problem' in terms of changes to several variables at the same time e.g. a given shock may be supposed to both increase food prices and reduce the demand for casual workers. This combination would increase the cost of living generally but would especially put added stress upon poorer households, who typically depend heavily on casual employment and would lose income through reduced numbers of days worked and/or reduced rates of pay, measured against their usual, baseline level. The scenario also includes any coping activity that brings some compensating income to households, as indicated by field evidence. The Outcome Analysis is then automatically expressed in graphic form, showing any change of the level of satisfaction of the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold – i.e. the capacity to maintain normal livelihood investments, including such things as school costs.

Once the HEA baseline data had been obtained from the field, analysed and set into a finalised baseline storage spreadsheet, the opportunity was taken to share the results with partners and to run basic scenarios related to Gaza. During the Outcome Analysis workshop with key partners, a strategic decision was taken to run scenarios for very poor households, as this is the most vulnerable group to shocks. As part of the process of creating scenarios partners were trained on the functionality of the HEA analysis tools and are now equipped to run scenarios for all the four wealth groups with whatever shocks – whatever combination of changes in variables – they chose to define.

Below we give the results of the scenarios chosen in the training. Each such scenario has a list of assumptions. The Analysis is provided first with reference to the international standard 2100 kcal pppd recommended energy allowance and then to the alternative 2355 kcal energy allowance (graphs in greyscale). Note: the graphs represent the baseline year in the left column, and the shock scenario or current year in the right column.

29. See UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009), pages 12 & 13
30. T. Boudreau, 'Adding Things Up" – Insights for DRR and CCA Policy and Programme Planning from a Consolidated Livelihoods Database, SCUK June 2013

Three Scenarios developed for Gaza are listed below in Table 12:

Table 12: Gaza Outcome Analysis Scenarios

Scenario 1a:	Reduction of food aid by 50% and 100%
Scenario 1b:	Reduction food and cash aid by 50% and 100%
Scenario 1c:	What would be the economic gap that needs to be filled from scenario 1b?
Scenario 2:	The effect of increased global staple food prices
Scenario 3:	How much would food and income increase if access to land in the buffer zone was increased by 50%, giving 15% more arable land?

Note: The variation of livelihoods protection thresholds within the 50% and 100% sub-scenario in Scenario 1a and 1b is because the livelihoods protection basket has a value that is constant in cash terms, but varies in kcal terms, which is according to the price of the staple food basket. With the higher staple food price in the 100% reduction scenario, the livelihoods protection basket is 'worth' fewer kcals. In other words, if you used the cash in the livelihoods protection basket to purchase staple food, you could buy fewer kcals under the 100% than the 50% reduction scenario.

Also, the reason the survival threshold is worth more than 100% kcals is because there is more than just staple food in the basket - there are all the non-food items (water, cooking fuel, etc.) that the field team judged were necessary for survival in Gaza.

The scenarios of reduced assistance test extreme parameters. But they illustrate a question of perhaps particular interest as to what increases in income would be needed to fill the gap of reduced food aid at given levels – not simply to indicate compensating cash-aid levels, but to show possible target levels for income generation projects. According to their interest, partners may run scenarios for other wealth groups too, and may pose more nuanced problems, with changes in more variables, whether of reduced assistance or of economic shocks reducing supply or incomes and/or raising prices.

Scenario 1a: Reduction of food aid by 50% and 100%

Assumptions

- Staple food prices increase
- Reduction in job opportunities (salaried, self-employment, casual labour)
- 2100 kcal per person per day energy requirement
- Survival threshold contains basic staples (wheat, oil, sugar, rice, pulses) and water and cooking fuel



50% Reduction

Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



100% Reduction

The left graphic shows that if food aid were to be reduced by 50% then very poor households would face a 20% livelihoods protection deficit. This means that normal expenditure on education, medicine, clothing, and other food items, such as dairy, meat, vegetables, etc. would need to be reduced by households to make sure they meet their essential needs. The scenario doesn't determine which combination of the items that fall under livelihood protection expenditure would be cut.

The right graphic posits a 100% reduction of food rations. The assumption here is that households would decrease livelihood protection expenditures in favour of purchasing items to keep up their survival basket, of staple foods, water and cooking fuel. In this case, households would have a livelihoods protection deficit of 51%. This household would be likely to reduce expenditure 'other food expenditures' compromising the quality of their diet, and the other items associated with maintaining livelihoods.

2355 kcal per person per day energy requirement

Raising the daily energy requirement to 2355 kcals pppd means that any reduction in food aid, whether 50% or 100%, would result in higher deficits. In this case, after a 50% reduction households would face an 20% livelihoods protection deficit and a 56% deficit if all food aid was discontinued. The difference in results between the 2100 kcal and the 2355 kcal benchmark is small, therefore the households' response to maintyain the surviaval basket would also be similar.



Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



Scenario 1b: Reduction food and cash aid by 50% and 100%

Assumptions

- Staple food prices increase
- Reduction in job opportunities (salaried, self-employment, casual labour)
- 2100 kcal per person per day energy requirement
- Survival threshold contains basic staples (wheat, oil, sugar, rice, pulses) and water and cooking fuel
- Decreased petty trade opportunities (lower demand)



50% Reduction

Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



100% Reduction

Scenario 1b poses the more severe problem of a reduction of both food and cash assistance by 50% and 100%. The left graphic shows that if food and cash aid is reduced by 50% then very poor households will face a 43% livelihood protection deficit. Similar to scenario 1a above, this assumes that households would reduce one or a combination of livelihood protection expenditures to be able to maintain their survival basket. This is not at the expense of luxuries but of expenditure on dietary diversity, education, health etc.

In the right graph, when food and cash aid are completely removed, the result shows that very poor households will have a survival deficit of 3% and a LPH deficit of 100%.

The 100% deficit is a complete cut in livelihoods protection. At this point they have no other expenditures aside from the amounts they spend on survival. Even with a drastic cut in expenditure on their normal livelihood budget they still begin to go hungry.

2355 kcal per person per day energy requirement

Using an energy requirement of 2355 kcals the situation for the very poor is slightly worse. A 50% reduction of food and cash assistance translates into a 47% livelihoods protection deficit while a 100% reduction results in a survival deficit of 14%.



Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



Scenario 1c: What would be the economic gap that needs to be filled by casual labour to cover the gap of scenario 1b?

Assumptions

- Staple food prices increase by 24% and 54% for the 50% and 100% reduction respectively
- Reduction in job opportunities (salaried, self-employment, casual labour)
- Daily rate for labour is same as reference year
- Cash increase will come from labour opportunity from a project
- 2100 kcal per person per day energy requirement
- Survival threshold contains basic staples (wheat, oil, sugar, rice, pulses) and water and cooking fuel
- Decreased petty trade opportunities (lower demand)



Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold

50% Reduction



100% Reduction

This scenario uses the factors set in scenario 1b i.e. a 50% and 100% reduction in food and cash assistance. The livelihood protection and survival deficits are the same, but here we ask by how much income would have to increase to meet their livelihood protection benchmark. Note: the increased income percentage circled in the graphics is only to meet their minimum livelihood protection benchmark, not to get back to reference year levels. The first example shows that households will need to increase their total income by 44% to get to their livelihood protection level. This mean that they would need to earn 1,794 NIS extra per year from casual labour. Loans should not be considered unless they are in reality gifts that effectively do not increase household debt. At the reference yeart daily rate of 30 NIS, very poor households will have to find casual labour opportunities for additional 60 days.

With all assistance removed, they would need to increase their total income earned by 103% or roughly 5216 NIS or 174 days. .

2355 kcal per person per day energy requirement

The percentage of the income needed to fill the gap of a 50% to 100% reduction in food and cash assistance is slightly more when using the 2355 kcal daily requirement.



Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



Scenario 2: The effect of increased global staple food prices on very poor households in both the Greater Gaza Urban Zone and the Gaza Semi-Agricultural Zone?

Assumptions

- Staple food prices doubled
- Other food increased by 50%
- 2100 kcal per person per day energy requirement
- Survival threshold contains basic staples (wheat, oil, sugar, rice, pulses) and water and cooking fuel



URB

Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



SAG

This scenario predicts the effect of increased staple food prices on very poor households in the two livelihood zones: Urban Gaza (URB) and Semi=Agricultural Gaza (SAG). As a knock-on effect of the increase in staple food prices it is also deemed that non-staple food prices will increase by 50%.

In the urban zone very poor households would face a 26% deficit, but their neighbours in the Semi-Agricultural Zone will have a distinctly smaller livelihoods protection deficit of 14%. Note: consumption of their own crops lessens the impact of higher staple food prices. The main economic blow to the very poor in both zones is the 50% increase in non-staple food items included in the livelihoods protection basket, i.e. all food except for wheat, rice, oil, sugar and lentils. Though the 50% price increase represents a knock-off effect from the increase in staple food prices.

It should be noted that such an extreme price shock is quite hypothetical: the global staple food increase of 2008 created a increase of 22% in food prices in Gaza. The fact that the effect of the extreme increase in food prices is not outright hunger even amongst the poorest, as it would be for instance in many African settings, suggests a certain resilience in the Gazan economy. On the other hand, in this scenario only the two (price) variables were changed against the baseline: it would be possible to develop the scenario with further associated changes to other prices, and to employment and/or other factors, to see what difference the combination would make. The content that fall within the livelihood protection baskets for both zones are slightly different, therefore the livelihood protection thresholds reflect those differences.

2355 kcal per person per day energy requirement

When using the 2355 kcal requirement, livelihood protection deficits increase by more than in the previous scenarios. In the urban zone (left graphic), very poor households will face a 33% deficit whereas the very poor in the agriculture zone will only have a 21% livelihoods protection deficit.



Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



Scenario 3: How much would food and income increase if land access to the buffer zone was increased by 50% giving 15% more arable land? Semi-Agricultural Zone (SAG)

Assumptions

- Crop production increases by 50%
- Agriculture labor increases by 50%
- 2100 kcal per person per day energy requirement
- Survival threshold contains basic staples (wheat, oil, sugar, rice, pulses) and water and cooking fuel



Very poor - SAG

Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



Poor - SAG

The assumption here is that with increased access to land, the wealthier farmers would employ more labour to deal with increased production – to the benefit of the poorer households who depend on this kind of work. It is assumed that the poorer households would also produce more crops for themselves for sale and consumption, adding to their total food and cash income. But the main advantage for them financially is the increased employment. This pushes both wealth groups beyond the reference year values, surpassing their livelihoods protection by 41% for the very poor (4320 NIS) and about 42% for the poor (6200 NIS).

2355 kcal per person per day energy requirement

Using the higher food energy requirement makes only minimal difference. All that changes is that the gains in the consumption of own produced staples is slightly offset by the additional consumption of 255 kcals pppd.



Livelihoods Protection Threshold

Survival Threshold



10. Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions and recommendations presented here should be seen in the light of a tight protracted blockade of the Gaza Strip that is the root cause for the crippling economic situation in which the Gaza population has to make its living The mandate and tasks of the HEA study in the Gaza Strip were to obtain field information on the livelihoods of the people in Gaza, analyse and present them, and prepare for an Outcome and Scenario Analysis. In the desperate situation of Gaza that has a severe impact on life and livelihoods of people living in the Gaza Strip, it is hoped that the further understanding of Palestinian household economies in Gaza provided by this HEA study will contribute to decision-making by government, NGO and donor agencies. On the basis of this study, this Chapter offers without pretending to be exhaustive, a number of thoughts on potential programming and policy options for interventions can be brought forward and on possible follow-up use of the HEA Approach. The intention is to provide contributions to further discussion and reflection by the numerous local institutional and humanitarian and development partners, who we hope will consider the livelihoods information provided in this report in the light of their own knowledge of the wider political, economic and social context of Gaza.

Coverage and depth

As mentioned above this HEA study doubled the sample size in the Urban Livelihood Zone representing about 90 to 95 % of the population. The methodology design for this particular study allows only assessing typical households for the different wealth groups in the livelihood zones selected for study: the Greater Gaza Urban and the Semi-Agricultural Gaza Livelihood Zones. In Gaza these were the two dominant ones and were selected on the basis of recommendations of the Advisory Committee. A further refinement of the assessment by distinguishing a finer break-down of wealth groups or for different beneficiary groups according to age, gender, health, disabled, etc) is methodologically very possible. However, this would importantly increase sample size and consequently cost of the study. In view of the budget, mandate and terms of references for this study, a further refinement of the samples has not been undertaken. An important part of that mandate includes the comparability of the outcomes of the Gaza HEA study with other HEA studies implemented in more than 50 other countries, that have restricted analysis and sampling to the methodology design applied also here in Gaza.

Conclusions

The above HEA Outcome/Scenario Analysis makes it clear that with current levels of household income poorer households would be challenged to cope with a substantial reduction of assistance in food and/or cash, even if they might not go absolutely hungry. However, in a very strict sense, the study also indicates that even with such a substantial reduction in food and/or cash assistance, people could still meet their basic energy requirements either at the 2100 kcal or 2355 kcal per day level. The only exception here are

the very poor in case of a 100% reduction of both food and cash aid. People's budgets are based in part on long-term food and cash assistance, and if they were forced to switch expenditure to maintaining their basic survival food basket, this would be at considerable cost to the proper balance of their diets and/or what should be considered essential livelihood expenditure, including for instance school and health costs. In other words this would materially affect the already highly constrained livelihoods of the poorest, beginning with the proper balance of their diet.

The study underlines that in view of the lack of perspective of a substantial lifting of the blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza, there are no short-term and quick-fit **solutions** to substantially replace the much needed food and cash assistance by other interventions. Cash or food assistance would need to continue until interventions to increase economic activity and hence job and income opportunities would bear fruit. If economic growth/higher incomes were to occur in the near future, then such cash assistance could be short term. However, if that were not the case (which is likely given the on-going blockade, and the little emphasis on development funding from donors etc) then the study demonstrates the continued need for such assistance.

The scenarios recommended by the Advisory Committee and developed in consultation with major actors as INGOs, WFP, FAO and UNRWA are also useful in pointing to the level of extra income that would be needed to fill gaps created by greater or lesser changes in levels of assistance. In the unique situation of Gaza, the blockade can be considered as the root problem behind the current process of de-development in Gaza and the resulting precarious food security situation. The blockade hence causes a permanent protracted emergency severely limiting people's income earning options. From the study it is also indicated that there is not really a shortage in food supply but an extreme difficulty of people in lower wealth groups to pay for it. There is rather a problem of food accessibility than food availability. Expanding job and other income opportunities would be a priority in the longer term. It is therefore important to see what resources are available to people and how to develop them in a way to stimulate at least a modest improvement in income of the poorer households, even in the short-term under the continuing blockade. The HEA information gives a clear view of the household economic operation and its constraints; the challenge is to determine what type of development and investment activities could provide on the shorter or longer term a significant addition to what they are currently doing and which could increase incomes, without increasing risks and costs in an unacceptable way, and with a view to sustainability in the medium to long term.

General recommendations

As mentioned above the study has very clearly identified that the poorer sections in Gaza' society will fall short of meeting their energy requirements without a substantial amount of cash or food aid. Market surveys have also indicated that securing enough food is not primarily an availability issue but an accessibility problem, food being available in the market but people not being able to pay for it. At the same time, many of the interviewed key informants and staff in the participating or consulted organizations have indicated that more economic activity, and hence more jobs and income in the Gaza Strip could partly resolve this accessibility problem. Obviously such a scenario would not deliver effect in the short term and surely cash or food assistance would need to continue until the much needed income opportunities materialise. On the basis of all the rich discussions, interviews and meetings held around the implementation of this study and informed by the outcome of this HEA, four main directions for recommendations could be given. They apply in the current status quo of a continued blockade, under a scenario of increased food prices and even under a positive scenario of more access to arable land. The scenarios of reduced food and cash aid have been elaborated in order to highlight what would happen in a drastically worsening situation of a complete closure of the Gaza Strip (tunnels and Israeli crossings) or a long-term further escalation of the conflict, i.e. a much longer period of armed conflict than the winter 2008/2009 and November 2012 emergency peaks.

1. Continued food and cash assistance as long as the blockade is maintained and hence economic activity is severely constrained. In view of the observed availability of food on the market a priority should be given to cash transfers, which can give people choice, restore their dignity and help stimulate the local economy. Such assistance should explicitly consider the economic security and rights of women in programme design. Attention should also be given to measures that can contribute to supporting those who are currently receiving cash or food assistance to access employment or other forms of sustainable income generation that are viable within the constraints of the blockade[31] .

2. Interventions that will reduce expenditures on public services, for instance by increasing the provi-

31. For further information on the opportunities and challenges relating to cash transfers in the OPT please refer to:
a. the UN report published in August 2012, "Gaza in 2020: A Liveable Place?"
b. a recent ODI report on cash transfer programmes in OPT: http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8311.pdf
c. Publications from the Cash Learning Partnership: http://www.cashlearning.org/english/home

sion and effectiveness and such services. At the same time measures to reduce energy costs for heating and cooking could also contribute to reduce expenditures and make financial household resources available for other basic needs as food.

3. Increased investments in local economic activity that could trigger innovative developments contributing to – even if only partly – alleviating the current situation of very limited job and income opportunities. The discussions held around this study have inspired participants to suggest a number of potential avenues that would deserve further exploration. They are shortly mentioned below

4. Enhancing follow-up activities to further refine findings of the HEA here reported and to explore how the HEA baseline could be used for monitoring and assessing impact of both emergency and development activities. A number of options are suggested below.

Suggestions for exploring opportunities for increased economic activity

The following summarizes suggestions made by many interlocutors in the course of this study of avenues that could be further explored for their feasibility and potential impact within the actual constraints of the tight economic blockade of the Gaza Strip. These suggestions could gain inspiration from efforts already underway, such as in small scale manufacturing through private sector support by USAID and DFID, and in food and dairy processing and IT initiatives through DANIDA. The suggestions made here are perhaps ambitious as the scenario 1c described in Chapter 9 indicates that a 100% increase in cash income from labor would be required to compensate for a total reduction of relief assistance. At the same time, they provide a challenge to stimulate innovation in current thinking on humanitarian and development aid. With the little space left in the situation of Gaza, working towards greater complementarity of humanitarian and more sustainable development programming by supporting agriculture and SMEs provides a political message and value that can be as important as financial sustainability.

The following development/investment activities were proposed to the HEA study researchers during the course of the study that while challenging could potentially increase incomes of poorer people in the context of Gaza:

• **Small-scale processing and manufacturing** to meet a sustained internal demand in Gaza. Such development interventions would include a research component to identify products that are currently sourced outside the Gaza Strip but might be replicated and/or improved using materials accessible in Gaza at acceptable cost. Such a study would measure the demand for such products locally and gauge the level of effort required to meet all or part of the demand. These interventions would likely include the partnering of NGOs with private-sector actors. Market demand would be an integral component in the selection process of the manufactured good(s) to be processed or manufactured locally.

• **Intensifying small-scale urban and peri-urban agriculture** activities with low-external inputs for high quality produce demanded at the local level that could replace actual imports from Egypt and Israel (and in the longer term for export markets). As for manufacturing activities this would require a market study into feasible products and agricultural practices. Practices for low external input and sustainable agriculture (LEISA[32]) have been explored in many other parts of the world among local and small-scale farmers for more

32. Reijntjes Coen, Bertus Haverkort and Ann Waters-Bayer, 1992, Farming for the Future. An intrducion to Low-External Input and Sustainable Agriculture. Macmillan Education Ltd. London/ETC-ILEIA, Leusden.

than 30 years, and its potential is still underdeveloped here in the Gaza Strip. Such interventions would also aim to support farmers living near or close to the buffer zone, inter alia in rain fed crop production to increase fodder production, water infrastructure, land rehabilitation and produce marketing. Apart from farmers and their organizations, such sustainable urban agriculture projects would also identify the actors that could play a role in local value chains for products to be sold on the local market (and potentially for export purposes).

• **Investing in IT and Internet-based business** is one export possibility, which may escape the boundaries of the blockade. Within Gaza, there are a number of technically competent and talented programmers and developers. Small-scale pilot projects could help facilitate the first steps in online/internet based income generation, exploring opportunities and competitiveness. One option could be the out-sourcing to Gaza of IT work and call centers from Arabic companies outside Gaza.

Ways forward for using the Household Economy Analysis

HEA scenario analysis does not necessarily refer only to the predicted effects of shocks and emergencies. It is also useful in thinking about project development. Instead of a shock being introduced as the 'problem' for a scenario, one can introduce other specifications such as changes resulting from humanitarian and development interventions, to show the likely economic effects on a specific wealth group. This application helps decision makers determine which intervention is most appropriate and effective. For example, it would be possible to refine the agricultural scenario proposed in this report in terms of agricultural intensification/LEISA, or to look at small-scale manufacturing or other possible development scenarios.

In this light, the HEA baselines and associated analytical tools could be used in three possible ways to help stakeholders in Gaza with their current and future programs. The first suggested application of the baselines is to develop a monitoring system for livelihood focused recovery and development projects. The key question here would be: what is the impact of these projects on the economic situation of targeted households. An advantage of the HEA baseline analysis is that with its overall, quantified understanding of how household level economy normally operates, it offers a benchmark to gauge the income and expenditure effects of a project for a target group.

HEA information can also help organizations to establish targets both in beneficiary numbers and in graduation thresholds for the affected populations. Finally, guidance for planning may be sought from multi-year scenarios, to see how an intervention might progress through the life cycle of a project. Hazard scenarios can be examined as part of the multi-year analysis to show potential pitfalls in meeting project goals. In further follow-up activities, it is important to validate findings with the local communities and authorities involved in the study.

The second suggested application of the HEA baseline would be to support the development of a Market Information and Food Security Response Analysis or MIFIRA[33]. The MIFIRA framework allows analysts to compare the increase in demand from an existing or planned cash transfer with local trader capacity. By comparing the total increase in demand generated by a program with traders' total, short-term excess capacity, it is possible to determine whether a specific cash transfer program is likely to risk inflating food prices in Gaza. Household economy data would be joined with the MIFIRA market analysis, for instance to help decision-makers estimate the feasibility for target wealth groups of replacing or supplementing food aid with cash or vouchers.

Finally, more robust scenarios of shocks would result from better information on people's past and potential coping strategies than it was possible to gather in the course of the present HEA study (see Chapter 8). A third application hence could be a more detailed application of the soft ware to cater for further disaggregation of wealth and social groups. This would require further, relatively brief but specific fieldwork; it is suggested that this would be a worthwhile investment. More detailed study could be undertaken for further refining wealth groups, and disaggregation of different social categories, including gender and age differentiation. For such refinement the HEA analytical framework can be used as basis providing quantifiable information. However it would be relevant to accompany such study by more right-based approaches, looking into rights of different beneficiary groups and working with similar focus groups to acquire complementary information, notably for better understanding gender differentiated household coping strategies.

Apart from these recommendations for further use and follow-up it is worthwhile to examine how HEA could complement other tools for monitoring food security and livelihood protection levels so as to better inform the overall response analysis. In order to maintain the transparent and participatory dynamics that have accompanied this study, it is recommended to nurture further action within the current institutional platforms, such as the Food Security Sector and ECHO partnerships.

33. MIFIRA was developed by Cornell University and has been field tested by CARE and CRS. It was subsequently used by WFP in the 2011 Somalia famine. Comprehensive documentation of the MIFIRA approach is available at: http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/MIFIRA/

ANNEX 1 THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Household Economy Baseline

The Household Economy Approach (HEA) to analysing livelihoods and assessing food security has been used widely in Africa and elsewhere over the past decade. The basic principle underlying the approach is that an analysis of local livelihoods is essential for a proper understanding of the impact– at household level - of hazards such as drought or conflict or market dislocation. Total crop failure may, for example, leave one group of households destitute because the failed crop is their only source of staple food, while another group may be able to cope because they have alternative food and income sources that can make up the production shortfall (e.g. they may have livestock to sell or relatives living elsewhere that can provide assistance). The idea of the household economy baseline is to capture this essential information on local livelihoods and coping strategies, making it available for the analysis of hazard impacts.

A Livelihood is the sum of ways in which people make their living. In the context of an analysis of food and non-food needs, the most important aspects of livelihood to understand are the means by which people produce food for themselves, and the means by which they obtain income to buy food and non-food goods and services from others.
A livelihood zone is an area within which people share broadly the same means of production and broadly the same patterns of access to markets.

Livelihood Zone Map: The Limpopo Basin, Mozambique
(With district boundaries)



Good market access is at the heart of livelihood patterns near the coast, and local households benefit from some of the highest purchasing power in the Basin.

Patterns of livelihood clearly vary from one area to another, according to local factors such as climate, soil, access to markets etc. The first step in a household economy analysis is therefore to

prepare a livelihood zone map, i.e. a map delineating geographical areas within which people share basically the same patterns of access to food (i.e. they grow the same crops, keep the same types of livestock, etc.) and have the same access to markets and to sources of cash income. An example of a livelihood zone map based on information gathered from southern Mozambique is presented above.

In nearly all developing countries, the household is the basic unit of economic operation in rural areas in terms of the ownership of land and livestock and equipment, of stocking and consuming food, and of sharing cash income. The household is therefore taken as the basic unit of reference in household economy analysis.
Where a household lives is one factor determining its options for obtaining food and generating income. Another is wealth, since this is the major factor determining the ability of a household to exploit the available options within a given zone. It is obvious, for example, that better-off households owning larger farms will in general produce more crops and be more food secure than their poorer neighbours. Land is just one aspect of wealth, however, and wealth groups are typically defined in terms of their land holdings, livestock holdings, capital, education, skills, labour availability and/or social capital. Defining the different wealth groups in each zone is the second step in a household economy analysis, the output from which is a wealth breakdown.

Having grouped households according to where they live and their wealth, the next step is to generate household economy baseline information for typical households in each group for a defined reference or baseline year[34]. Access to food and to non-food goods and services is determined by investigating the sum of ways households obtain food and cash — what food they grow, gather or receive as gifts, how much food they buy, how much cash income is earned in a year, and how other essential needs are met with income earned.

Once this baseline is established, an analysis can be made of the likely impact of a shock or hazard in a bad year. This is done by assessing how access to food and cash income will be affected by the shock, what other food and cash sources can be added or expanded to make up initial shortages, and what final deficits emerge.

Once the baselines have been compiled, the idea is that they can be used repeatedly over a number of years - until significant changes in the underlying economy render them invalid. Rural economies in developing countries tend not to change all that rapidly however, and a good household economy baseline will generally be valid for between 5 and 10 years. What varies is the prevailing level of access to food and non-food goods and services, but this is a function of variations in hazard, not variations in the baseline. Put another way, the level of maize production may vary from year to year (hazard), but the underlying pattern of agricultural production does not (the baseline).

34. The baseline or reference year can be the last 12 months or a 'normal' or typical year. In terms of data collection and the ability of interviewees to recollect details (including quantities and prices), it is usually best to choose a recent year. The most recent 12 month period is ideal (beginning at the start of the harvest for agricultural communities); provided there wasn't an unusually large amount of food aid or other assistance distributed and provided it wasn't a very good year. If any of these situations applies then it can be very difficult to understand coping strategies and it makes sense to choose an earlier year.

ANNEX 2 LIVELIHOODS AND SURVIVAL PROTECTION THRESHOLDS

The output from an outcome analysis is an estimate of total food and cash income for the current year, once the cumulative effects of current hazards and income generated from coping strategies have been taken into account. The next step is to compare projected total income against two clearly defined thresholds to determine whether an intervention of some kind is required.

The two thresholds – the Livelihoods Protection Threshold and the Survival Threshold – are described in the figure below. The Survival Threshold is the amount of food and cash income required to ensure survival in the short-term, i.e. to cover minimum food and non-food needs. Minimum non-food needs will generally include the costs of preparing and consuming food plus any cash expenditure on water for human consumption. Shelter and clothing are also basic requirements for survival, and it may on rare occasions be appropriate to include these in the minimum non-food basket. The point to bear in mind here is that the items included in the minimum non-food basket should be those required to ensure survival in the short term. In most settled rural situations, expenditure on shelter and clothing can be forgone in a bad year, with repairs to housing and replacement of clothes being postponed until better times. Situations in which failure to spend money on shelter and clothing could be life-threatening might include war (where shelters are destroyed and clothing looted), and sudden onset disasters such as earthquake, hurricane or flood.

The Livelihoods Protection Threshold is the amount of food and cash income required to protect local livelihoods. This means a level of income that gives people the option to maintain expenditure on basic non-food goods and services at the levels prevailing in the reference year (assuming the reference year was neither especially good nor especially bad). This does not mean that people will have exactly the same standard of living as in the reference year (since the livelihoods protection basket excludes non-essential items such as beer and cigarettes), nor that they will pursue exactly the same activities as in the reference year (since the Livelihoods Protection Threshold is set at a level that assumes additional income can be generated from coping strategies).

But it does mean that – provided they prioritise these items – people can continue to spend similar amounts of money on inputs and on health and education as in the reference year.

An Example of an Outcome Analysis for Poor Households from the Wolayita Maize and Root Crop Livelihood Zone in Southern Ethiopia

Three types of quantitative data are combined to predict outcome; data on baseline sources of food and cash, data on the hazard and data on coping strategies.

First of all, the effects of the hazard on baseline sources of food and cash income are calculated (middle bar in the chart).

Then the effect of any coping strategies is added in (right-hand bar).

The result is an estimate of maximum total food and cash income for the current year.

Note: *In this graphic, food and cash income have been added together and, in this case, expressed in food terms. (The results could also be expressed in cash terms – see* ***Error! Reference source not found.***



Comparison of Projected Income against Tow Clearly Defined Thresholds

Projected total income (including income from coping) is compared against tow thresholds defines on the basis of local patterns of expenditure.

The Survival Threshold
reprisents the total income required to cover:
• 100% of minimum food energy needs (2100 kcals per person), plus
• the costs associated with food preparation and nocsumption (i.e. salt, soap, kerosene and/or firewood for cooking and lighting), plus
• any expenditure on water for human consumption.

The Livelihoods Protection Threshold represent the total income required to sustain local livelihoods. This means total expenditure to:
• ensure basic survival (see above), plus
• maintain accessw to basic services (e.g. routine medical and schooling expenses), plys
• sustain livelihood in the medium to longer term (e.g. regular purchases of seeds, fertilizer, veterianary drugs, etc.), plus
• achieve a minimum locally accepteable standard of living (e.g. purchase of basic clothing, coffee/tea, etc.)



Besides these essential non-food goods and services, the Livelihoods Protection expenditure basket can also contain a number of items that – while not absolutely essential for survival – can nonetheless be considered essential in terms of sustaining a minimum locally acceptable standard of living. It is usually quite easy to identify these items through discussions with local key informants. Tea and sugar, for example, are considered essential among Somalis, and it is appropriate to include these in the Livelihoods Protection basket in Somali areas. For highland Ethiopians, on the other hand, tea and sugar will be replaced in the Livelihoods Protection basket by coffee and berberi (a mix of spices based on chilli pepper). Clearly, the exact composition of the Livelihoods Protection Basket will vary from livelihood zone to livelihood zone, depending upon local circumstances. This applies not only to items such as tea and coffee, but also to inputs (e.g. veterinary drugs in pastoral areas verses fertilizer in agricultural areas) and to health expenditures (e.g. expenditure on anti-malarials in lowland but not highland areas).

Another important point about the Livelihoods Protection Threshold is that, as defined here, it is set relative to local conditions rather than relative to international standards, such as Sphere. This is an area for further debate and further work, i.e. should the Livelihoods Protection Threshold be set relative to international standards, and if so, which standards should be adopted for those items not covered by, for example, Sphere (which does not include standards for firewood or for fertilizer, for example)?

Analysing Coping Strategies[35]

It is not usual to include every possible coping strategy in the calculation of outcome. This would have the effect of minimising and almost certainly underestimating the need for assistance as measured by the deficit[36]. Instead, only those strategies that are appropriate responses to local stress are included. In this context, appropriate means both 'considered a normal response by the local population' and 'unlikely to damage local livelihoods in the medium to longer term'. In a pastoral setting, for example, it is usual to increase livestock sales in a bad year. This is an appropriate response to economic stress - provided the increase in sales is not excessive.

Similarly, in many agricultural areas, it may be usual for one or more household members to migrate for labour when times are hard. Provided the response is not pushed too far (i.e. too many people migrating for too long a period of time), this can also be considered an appropriate response to stress. In HEA, therefore, the most important characteristic of a coping strategy is its cost, where cost is measured in terms of the effect on livelihood assets, on future production by the household, and on the health and welfare of individual household members. The table presents a basic categorisation of coping strategies according to cost. Note that cost is not just a function of the type of activity, but the extent to which it is utilised (as in the livestock sale and labour migration examples described above).

Type of Coping Strategy

Low Cost (included in outcome analysis)
- Reduced expenditure on non-essential items (cigarettes, ceremonies, festivals, expensive clothing, meat, sugar, more expensive staples, etc.)
- Harvesting of reserve crops (e.g. cassava, enset)
- Consumption rather than sale of any crop surplus

Medium Cost (included in outcome analysis)
- Increased sale/slaughter of livestock (sustainable)
- Intensification of local labour activities
- Short-term/seasonal labour migration
- Intensification of self-employment activities (firewood, charcoal, building poles, etc.)
- Increased remittance income
- Increased social support/gifts
- Borrowing of food/cash
- Sale of non-productive assets (jewellery, clothing, etc.)

High Cost (excluded from outcome analysis)
- Unsustainable sale/slaughter of livestock
- Long-term/permanent migration (including distress migration of whole households)
- Sale of productive assets (land, tools, seeds, etc.)
- Reduced expenditure on productive inputs
- Reduced expenditure on health and education
- Reduced expenditure on water
- Decreased food intake

35. Note that some strategies usually included in lists of coping strategies are not included here, e.g. strategies that maintain primary production in the face of a hazard (e.g. re-planting of crops, replacement of long-cycle by short-cycle crops, long distance grazing of livestock). This is because in household economy analysis these aspects of coping are captured in the 'hazard'. Replanting of crops and replacement of long- by short-cycle crops are captured through the crop production 'problem' and the effects of long-distance grazing are captured through the livestock production 'problem'.

36. This is because the inclusion of a strategy in the outcome analysis has the effect of reducing the deficit, effectively delaying any intervention until that strategy has been fully utilised. It would not, for example, make sense to include the sale of all livestock in the outcome analysis, as this would delay intervention until all livestock had been sold – rendering pastoral households destitute, for example. Likewise it makes no sense to include undesirable stress-induced activities such as prostitution in the calculation of outcome, since this would reduce the estimated assistance requirement by an amount equivalent to the income that can be earned from prostitution.

What it Means if Total Income Falls below One or Other Threshold

The figure compares three different situations, of progressively greater severity and urgency.

(A) – No deficit: In this situation, total income (including income from low and medium-cost coping strategies) is sufficient to ensure basic survival and to protect existing patterns of livelihood. There is therefore no pressing need for an emergency intervention.

(B) – Livelihoods Protection Deficit: Total income is no longer sufficient to cover the cost of survival plus the expenditure required to protect local livelihoods, and an intervention of some kind is required to cover the deficit. At this level, local people can still cover expenditure on survival (including the consumption of 2100 kcals per person per day), provided they accord these needs a high enough priority. In other words, people should not have to go hungry at this level[1], although they will have to resort to other high-cost strategies including a reduction in expenditure on productive inputs, on health and on education. The primary objective of intervention at this level is to protect livelihoods, both in the current year and for the future.

(C) – Survival Deficit: At this level, total income is insufficient to cover the cost of survival, even if full use is made of all the available low- and medium-cost coping strategies, and all the money usually used to protect livelihoods is switched to the purchase of staple foods. It is very probable that people facing this type of deficit will go hungry, unless they resort to other undesirable high-cost coping strategies. The primary objective of intervention at this level is to protect health and life in the short-term.



1 Although they may opt to do so, if, for example, not increasing livestock sales or not migrating for labour has a higher priority than maintaining food intake.

How HEA Helps Address Core Decision Maker Questions

If total income falls below one or other threshold, this implies the existence of a deficit and the need for an intervention of some kind. HEA helps to distinguish clearly between situations according to their severity and urgency. The existence of a Livelihoods Protection Deficit indicates the need for interventions to protect livelihoods, while a Survival Deficit indicates the need for an intervention to ensure survival in the short term.

There is a range of options that can be used to fill a deficit, from food and cash transfers, through non-food interventions to market price interventions. Information on patterns of local livelihood (collected during the household economy fieldwork) will help to identify the most appropriate intervention in any particular situation. The only point to bear in mind in relation to the type of deficit is that the intervention selected must be commensurate with the scale and urgency of the problem. There is little point, for example, in proposing a distribution of soap to fill a survival deficit. Something much larger in scale will generally be required, which will usually mean a distribution of food or cash, or a market intervention on a relatively large scale.

The output from a Household Economy analysis is quantitative. That is HEA provides quantitative estimates of how many people will face a deficit, how big that deficit is, and therefore the scale of intervention required to address the problem. Besides answering the critical question of how much? HEA also generates answers to the other core questions posed by decision-makers in relation to emergency interventions, as outlined below.

How HEA Helps Address Core Decision Maker Questions

Core question	How HEA helps answer the question
WHO	Wealth breakdowns help group the population in a way that shows who will be most affected by different shocks.
WHAT	Livelihood strategy identification, description and quantification (Food, income, expenditure) shows what can be done to support existing livelihoods, and, just as important, what might harm them.
HOW MUCH	Outcome analysis determines what kinds of gaps will be left in the event of a shock or multiple shocks. This leads directly to an analysis of how much help is needed.
WHERE	Livelihood zoning helps group people in a way that allows you to see where affected populations will be.
WHEN and FOR HOW LONG	Outcome analysis, combined with careful use of seasonal calendars, provides a basis for determining when different types of assistance are needed and for how long.

ANNEX 3 - MEMBERS HEA ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Name	Organization	Position	Contact Details
Nabil Abu Shammalah	Ministry of Agriculture	Director of Policy and Planning	nabilovic@hotmail.com
Mohammed Nassar	Ministry of Social Affairs	Projects Development Director	momednassar@gmail.com
Niveen Ishkontana	Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committee	External Relation and Cooperation Team	Niveen.ishkontana@apl-arc.org
Raoul Balletto	World Food Program	Gaza Food Coordinator and Head of Office	raoul.balletto@wfp.org
Damien Vaquier	UNRWA	Emergency Support Officer	d.vaquier@unrwa.org
Suyapno Ekci	Food and Agriculture Organization	Food security Analyst	Ekci.suyapno@fao.org
Anas Mussalam	Action Against Hunger	Food Security and Livelihood program Manager	Fspm-pt-ga@acf-e.org
Mohammed Sabe	Cooperative Housing Foundation	Food Security Program Manager	msabe@chf-pal.org
Peter Laban /Chair	Oxfam Italia	Associate Country Director	Peter.laban@oxfamitalia.org
Ludovica Socci / Secretary	Oxfam Italia	Gaza Area Manager	Ludovica.socci@oxfamitalia.org

ANNEX 4 - PARTICIPANTS HEA INCEPTION WORKSHOP 26TH JUNE 2012

Name	Organization	Position
Esmee' De Jong	ECHO	Head ECHO in OPT
Muriel De Wit	ECHO	Regional Programme Officer
Saber Ashour	ECHO	Programme Officer Gaza
Moahmmed Al Bakri	UAWC	General Manager
Jaber Qudah	Ma'an Development Center	Gaza Branch Director
Ahmed Sourani	PARC	Development Cooperation Advisor
Samy Ajjor	Palestinian Hydrology Group	Project Manager
Ibrahim Shaath	HelpAge International	Project Coordinator
Adel Abu Kmel	Action Against Hunger	Wash Project Manager
Anas Mussallam	Action Against Hunger	Food Security Project Manager
Ghassan Abu Mandil	PCBS	DB Officer
Alaa Al Adawi	Coopi	Site manager
Loek Peeters	CARE	Project Manager
Eid Siyam	CARE	Agricultural Engineer
Antoine Renard	World Food Program	Programme Officer
Hamada Al Bayari	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
Mohammed Bsaiso	UNRWA	Project Officer
Damien Vaquier	UNRWA	Emergency Support Officer
Ekci Suyapno	Food and Agriculture Organization	Food Security Unit
Masoud Keshta	Food and Agriculture Organization	Food Security Unit
Julie Campbell	Oxfam GB	Programme Manager
Ruth McCormack	Oxfam GB	Food Security coordinator
Ala'a Eid	Oxfam GB	ED Officer
Francesca Pini	Oxfam Italia	ECHO Project Manager
Serena Lunghi	Oxfam Italia	ECHO Project Administrator
Marco Ricci	Oxfam Italia	Project Coordinator
Tareq Al Qattaa	Oxfam Italia	Project Officer
Ahmed Al Sabe	Oxfam Italia	Project Officer
Wasim Ashour	Oxfam Italia	Logistician/Field Coordinator
Matteo Crosetti	Oxfam Italia	Project Manager
Peter Laban	Oxfam Italia	Associate Country Director

ANNEX 5 - PARTICIPANTS LIVELIHOOD ZONING WORKSHOP 25-26 SEPTEMBER 2012

Name	Organization	Position
Nabil Abu Shammalah	Ministry of Agriculture	Director-General of planning and Policies
Mahmoud El Jorani	Ministry of Agriculture	Director of the Department of NGOs
Mohammed Nassar	Ministry of Social Affairs	Projects Development Director
Mahmoud Kahlout	Ministry of Social Affairs	Social researchers
Ahmed Farid Abulehia	Ministry of Social Affairs	Social researchers
Niveen Ishkontana	Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committee	External Relation and Cooperation Team
Mervat Hasuna	Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committee	Projects Coordinator
Ahmed Safi	Ma'an Development Center	Agriculture and Environment Program Officer
Said Al Hassnai	Union of Agriculture Work Committees	Director of production projects
Bashar Ashour	Palestinian Hydrology Group	Hydro Geologist
Suyapno Ekci	Food and Agriculture Organization	Food Security Unit
Abdo Seyam	Food and Agriculture Organization	Food Security Unit
Ibrahim Hejoj	UNRWA	Poverty Advisor
Damien Vaquier	UNRWA	Emergency Support Officer
Rula Khalaf	World Food Program	Food Gaza deputy Coordinator
Salah Lahham	World Food Program	VAM officer
Mohammed Sabe	CHF	Food Security Program Manager
Loek Peeters	CARE	Program Manager Food Security
Eid Siyam	CARE	Project Offcier
Ahmed Sourani	Organization Development Consultant	O.D Consultant
Julius Holt	FEG	HEA Consultant
Elena Qleibo	Oxfam GB	FSL Coordinator
Rafat Hassouna	Oxfam GB	Project Officer
Ludovica Socci	Oxfam Italia	Gaza Area Manager
Wasim Ashour	Oxfam Italia	Logistician/Field coordinator
Marco Ricci	Oxfam Italia	Project Coordinator
Tareq Al Qatta'a	Oxfam Italia	Project Officer
Matteo Crosetti	Oxfam Italia	Program Coordinator
Peter Laban	Oxfam Italia	Associate Country Director
Ahmed Al Sabe	Oxfam Italia	Project Officer

ANNEX 6 - PARTICIPANTS OUTCOME ANALYSIS APRIL 2013

Name	Organization	Position
Peter Laban	Oxfam Italia	Associate Country Director
Elena Qleibo	Oxfam Gb	Food Security And Livelihoods Coordinator
Stan Morau	ACF	Food Security Coordinator
Damien Vaquier	UNRWA	Emergency Support Officer
Ruben Baert	FAO	Food Security Analyst
Rana Hannoun	FAO	Econometrician Fs Unit
Raoul Balletto	WFP	Gaza Food Coordinator And Head Of Office
Tareq Al Qatta'a	Oxfam Italia	Project Officer
Marco Ricci	Oxfam Italia	Project Coordinator
Stephen Browne	Food Economy Group	Consultant
Marco Tinchelli	Oxfam Italia	Project Officer
Ludovica Socci	Oxfam Italia	Gaza Area Manager
Julius Holt	Food Economy Group	Consultant